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ABSTRACT 
Effective crisis management and communication is crucial during any 
catastrophic event, otherwise fear, panic, and mass hysteria can prevail. The public relies 
heavily on the government (police) and the media for information during a crisis. This 
thesis focuses on a joint police and media response plan and outlines a preparation plan to 
assist the public during a terrorist attack or similar crisis. Historically, the police and the 
media have had opposing views regarding sharing and disseminating information to the 
public. This report studies the inherent mistrust between both organizations and proposes 
strategies to overcome the suspicion and build a partnership. Proven community policing 
models within the Philadelphia Police Department are examined as a potential template 
for a police and media partnership. Survey results and focus group responses from the 
police, media, and the community are presented. This document examines national and 
international lessons learned and offers best practices on providing timely and accurate 
information, educating and informing the public, and improving communication and trust 
between the police and the media. The proposed police and media training curriculum 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The media and the government are directly responsible for our views on 
terrorism. How the events unfold immediately after an incident and how the crisis is 
communicated can have a detrimental effect on the public. Five years ago, America 
changed forever due to the atrocities of September 11, 2001. Many citizens found 
themselves dealing with a new sense of insecurity. Our sense of asylum on our own soil 
shattered when al-Qaeda hijacked airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. A fourth plane reportedly targeted the White House. The 
hijackers of United Flight 93 may have succeeded if not for the heroes onboard, who 
brought the plane down before the intended strike.  
Additionally, Hurricane Katrina’s wrath and a growing list of government errors 
have left Americans feeling less safe since 9/11. Media reports on both incidents have 
crumbled public confidence in the government’s ability with respect to anti-terrorism 
efforts and crisis response. Compounding the public’s lack of confidence has been a 
series of misinformation from the media on the global war on terror (GWOT). 
Subsequently, public confidence in the government and the media has suffered.  
The government and the media must do more in an effort to learn from the lessons 
of 9/11, Katrina, and other disasters. We need to go beyond numbly accepting occasional 
inconvenience to welcoming shared efforts and sacrifices that could produce real 
progress on security and the proper dissemination of timely and accurate information to 
the public. A local Philadelphia television reporter summed it up well: “We need to 
collectively produce a reservoir of goodwill in combating a disaster and helping the 
public.”1  
This thesis proposes an unusual partnership between two forces the public so 
vehemently relies upon for information in times of a crisis: the police and the media. This 
document explores the strategies available to the PPD and the Philadelphia media outlets 
in developing partnerships to better calibrate and direct public response to a terrorist 
                                                 
1 Walt Hunter (news reporter, Eyewitness News, CBS TV 3), interview by the author, May 1, 2006. 
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incident. While the model in this thesis focuses on the PPD and the local media, the 
operating principles could be transferable to any agency and its media outlets.   
One of the principles of this collaboration is improving public confidence in 
government and the media during a catastrophic event. The police and the media are 
powerful forces that influence public behavior and perception. Merging both forces with 
the goal of securing the public’s safety is morally responsible; ignoring this responsibility 
strengthens the enemy. Successful law enforcement invariably rests on a sound 
foundation of public support. How the police department is portrayed by the media plays 
a major role in forming public opinion; how the police treat the media is important in 
how they portray the department. 
The PPD has a policy that supports openness and honesty with the media; it 
encourages all employees to maintain a friendly and cooperative relationship with 
journalists. However, a culture of apprehension persists when interacting with the media. 
In times when we are dealing with terrorist episodes, this apprehensive culture can prove 
to be a fatal mistake. The PPD and the local media have a history of poor relations; both 
organizations are distrustful and suspicious of each other. This is not unique to the PPD 
and should not be viewed as a criticism of the department or its members, nor the media. 
It’s an organizational culture shared by many departments across the country, who view 
information as an instrument of security; while the media argues that information is 
public property. Both are equally responsible for the current state of affairs.   
The police and the media have opposing views about how information should be 
presented. The police argue that the media frequently presents information out of context 
and therefore encourages the misinterpretation of information. The media argues that 
police are too possessive of information and try to restrict the manner in which 
information is presented, thus stifling the media’s freedom to report. While good, and at 
times excellent, relationships between some members of both professions exist, these 
relationships are an exception rather than the rule. As a whole, the department and the 
media share a symbiotic relationship, yet suspicion and mistrust continues to linger on 
both sides. This suspicion has contributed to the ebb and flow of the relationship, much 
like a stormy marriage. 
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This poor relationship is compounded by information technology, including 24-
hour media coverage of worldwide events, the internet, instant and text messaging. In this 
post–9/11 era, a deficient police/media relation is a recipe for poor communication, fear, 
and mass hysteria, which terrorists depend upon. The challenge undertaken in this thesis 
is to determine how the PPD can, in partnership with the media, formulate and 
disseminate timely and accurate information to the public during a crisis.  
In times of crises, law enforcement should view the media as a valuable outlet to 
communicate a calm and consistent message to the public. At the heart of police and 
media relations is credibility and trust. Although the two professions have different 
means in which to carry out their responsibilities, they have a common function: to serve 
the public.  Therefore, the two organizations need to respect each other and learn how to 
work together. This professional respect should supersede cultural differences and 
personal agendas. It should not be bribed nor bullied. Respect must be earned through the 
practice of open, honest, and transparent communication. The intended goal of this report 
is to form a partnership between the Philadelphia media and the PPD. Ultimately that 
partnership will lead to responsible communication, education, and information during a 
crisis, which will allay fears and reduce undue alarm to the public. Good media relations 
enhance the public’s opportunity to obtain information they are entitled to receive. 
Educating the public on how to respond to terrorism is an essential part of the police 
department’s goal, one that relies heavily on the cooperation of the media to disseminate 
information. Mutual respect and cooperation are necessary components for this 
partnership to succeed.  
Fundamentally, the police and media have different sets of interest, and they may 
often be at odds to some degree. An opportunity lies before these two organizations to 
develop a partnership. The means to promoting media/police collaboration in the United 
States is removing, or significantly reducing, mistrust and suspicion. Clearly one can 
argue that effective personal relationships between journalists and public officials can 
greatly facilitate the appropriate and responsible distribution of information. 
An effective media/police model sets the stage for the organizations to jointly 
become shepherds of the public and provide guidance that can: 
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• Save lives  
• Promote information and intelligence sharing 
• Educate the public 
• Reduce mass hysteria  
• Increase public confidence  
• Build a better understanding of police, media, and community roles 
 
Alternatively, if we do nothing, we fall victim to terrorist propaganda that leverages on 
the public’s ignorance about terrorism. This only compounds confusion and mass 
hysteria.   
The primary objective of terrorist acts is to create fear. Today’s terrorists view the 
media as an opportunity to exert omnipresence with a massive psychological impact that 
reaches a huge audience. This new threat endangers the freedom of the press and freedom 
of expression for those who try to fight terrorism. While this new challenge may make it 
difficult at times, our sense of honor will remain steadfast and our freedom of speech will 
continue to be a fundamental principle of a democratic society. 
While the best position for the citizenry is prevention, the focal point of this 
report is on response from the police and media at the local level, and how information is 
packaged and delivered.  The diversity of data must be measured to obtain the desired 
public response. Excellent examples of this cooperation between government and media 
exist in other countries, such as Britain and Israel, whose governments educate the police, 
the media, and the public.  In the United States, George Washington University has 
provided similar training to the police and media. Closer to home, the PPD has been 
provided with a fortuitous opportunity as the result of Temple University’s initiative 
training program, which supports media and law enforcement relations during an 
emergency.  
The community policing (CP) model in Philadelphia is an excellent example of a 
police/public partnership and it works. Several models that encourage partnership 
between police and outside entities are examined, and recommendations are made with 
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the goal of developing sound police and media relations. Because of these community 
relations, the Philadelphia community contradicts national polls of the public’s poor 
confidence in the police and media. Not surprising in this report, the Philadelphia 
community trusts the police more than the media. The majority of the community groups 
were neutral on media relations despite the media’s assertion of having good community 
relations. Based on the author’s 21 years of law enforcement experience, the reason the 
PPD enjoys this advantage over the media is mainly due to the numerous partnerships 
and relations developed over the years with its residents, business leaders, clergy, and 
elected officials. Using the CP model as a template for police and media relations may be 
the answer in bridging the gap between these two organizations. 
Representative samples of the stakeholders (the police, media, and community 
leaders) for this project were polled. They displayed a serious interest in searching for 
collaborative efforts in the interest of public safety and in the proper dissemination of 
critical information. Their views and recommendations stretch from ensuring accurate 
information is properly communicated to forming a partnership that includes cross 
training, educating the public, and tackling new challenges in this unprecedented joint 
venture.   
The Philadelphia police commanders and the Philadelphia media both want to 
develop a partnership for their interest but, equally important, for their consumers – the 
citizens. The local media emphasized the importance of responsible journalism and their 
desire for a partnership that promotes: 
• Training regularly with the police, which includes role playing 
• Consulting with the police on determining the sensitivity of information and 
retaining that information until the appropriate time 
• Formulating Police and Media Auxiliary Council, which promotes 
collaboration 
• Sharing the responsibility of  training the public  
• Open communication 
• Providing quality information 
• A strategy to reduce public panic and mass hysteria 
• A climate of need-to-share information  
 xx
• An informal policy on a case-by-case basis on reporting incidents of WMD 
• Informal scheduled meetings with police department officials to discuss 
counterterrorism measures and practices 
• Participation in a Media Police Academy 
• Trust   
 
The police commanders also expressed their desire for a partnership with the 
media and suggested the following caveats: 
• Provide timely and accurate information to the media  
• Provide specific instructions to the public through the media 
• Preparation is key; therefore, training with the media is imperative  
• Key decision makers from both organizations should participate in the training 
• Key decision makers from the police and media should meet to develop 
acceptable guidelines in crisis reporting 
• Develop a police embedded journalist program similar to the military model 
• Police officials recognize the media will not wait for information if the police 
do not cooperate; therefore, the police should cooperate with reasonable 
media requests 
• Be responsible in the face of adversity, and allay community fears as soon as 
possible 
• Share responsibility in educating the public  
• Collaboration among other law enforcement in disseminating information 
during a crisis is critical in reducing confusion  
• Local media partnership is embraced 
• CPA training for the media 
• Provide a subject matter expert to the media to address questions and help 
allay fears 
• Specialize training for commanders in crisis communication  
• Move toward a need-to-share environment rather than need-to-know 
• Build trust with the media 
 
The community leaders focused on ensuring that they receive instructions and 
accurate information. They decried irresponsible journalism and any mishandling of 
 xxi
critical information that can potentially cause chaos.  In light of these suggestions, many 
recommendations can be made that will ensure the issues highlighted will be adequately 
addressed. The information contained in this document may serve as an effective tool to 
thwart the objectives sought by terrorists. Having the media and the police work towards 
a common goal, albeit a challenging and unconventional one, will significantly impact 
the terrorists, who depend considerably upon the media frenzy. Most of the proposed 
strategies in this document are unprecedented in this nation. By following the practices 
outlined in this report, the PPD and the media will be pioneers in effectively dealing with 
the aftermath of a terrorist attack. It is incumbent upon the PPD and the media to 
understand that how information is framed during a crisis contributes to the physical and 







































A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Relations and Conflict 
A significant controversy and suspicion exists between two sources the public 
depends upon for information and direction: 1) media and 2) government. Relations 
between journalists and the government are frequently fraught with conflicting interests. 
Journalists strive to provide accurate, reliable and timely information, and they want to 
do it in an expeditious manner. Information, they argue, is public property, and the media 
should deliver it to its rightful owners as fast as possible. Politicians, police officers, and 
security officials [government] have another approach. “Information is an instrument of 
security and political policy to be manipulated, controlled and disseminated to suit 
strategic interests. Security personnel have their own clear view of what constitutes the 
public interest and very often, whether at war or peace, this conflicts with independent 
journalism.”2 
The media and the police have long had a strained relationship in communicating 
and distributing vital information to the public during an emergency. Each is equally 
responsible for the strained relationship. According to a veteran Philadelphia news 
reporter, who wishes to remain anonymous, “the strains between the media and law 
enforcement are as much created by the media as they are by police.”  This strained 
relationship has led to mistrust due to the inability of each side to understand the culture, 
role, and rules that its counterpart adheres to. Both operate under a timeline with 
opposing points of view. The media operates under time constraints while the 
government, specifically the police, operates under a “time of no essence” model, except 
during those emergencies where time may be a factor.  
These two factions stem from opposing cultures, the media in the need-to-share 
and the police in the need-to-know. Specifically, the police object to the media’s use of 
sensationalized sound bites, as compared to telling the “whole story” with the 
                                                 
2 Aidan White, “Security and the Media” (paper presented at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, 2003). 
2 
information presented in context.  The media distrust the police due to an impression of 
censorship of relevant information or of “covering up” information that may be essential 
to the story. In response, the police argue information is only withheld to protect the 
victim, the public, and/or the investigation.   
Highly charged, emotionally gut-wrenching events can work to define and clarify 
a built-in conflict of interest that exists between the media and police officials - conflicts 
that have historically resulted in hostility, suspicion, and occasionally violence.3    
Researchers have characterized the habitually stormy relationship as one comprised of 
“basic mistrust and perhaps even mutual dislike” between the two parties.4  
2. Source of Information 
In this turbulent era, the media has played a significant role in shaping popular 
views on terrorism. If a terrorist attack occurs, the public will immediately look to the 
media for information. Overall, cable is the top source of news for all Americans (53%), 
regardless of demographics. Americans follow the news more closely than they did 
before Sept. 11; and cable networks, such as CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News, are the first 
choice for news about terrorist attacks and the war on terrorism. 5   However, cable is not 
the only news source Americans rely upon; other outlets are providing information as 
well. Forty-four percent say they sometimes get news about issues related to terrorism 
from talk radio, 35 percent get news from the internet, and 24 percent get some news 
from religious radio and television programming. Newspapers rate a distant second to the 
electronic media, with about one-in-three saying they get most of their news this way.6 
Network television news, which was a top source for three out of ten Americans 
immediately following the 9/11 attacks, is now no more prominent a source of 
information about terrorism than radio or local television news.7 
                                                 
3 Tory J. Caeti, John Liederbach, and Steven S. Bellew, “Police-Media Relations at Critical Incidents: 
Interviews from Oklahoma City,” International Journal of Police Science & Management, no. 2, June 29, 
(Denton, Chilton Hall, 2004), 87. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Public Views of Terrorism Coverage (Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, 2005); available from http://people-




3. Public Confidence 
Despite the public’s dependence on the media for information, there are salient 
aspects of press behavior that the public views negatively. Overall, 52 percent say the 
press tries to cover up its mistakes and “gets in the way of” society solving its problems.8  
About the same amount believe that the press is politically biased. However, a recent 
study indicates the public also has little confidence that information provided by the 
government on the global war on terror (GWOT) and domestic anti-terrorism efforts is 
accurate.9 Generally, the public has about as much confidence in the government as it 
does in the press. Public confidence in information provided by the government on anti-
terrorism efforts in the United States is somewhat lower (61 percent fair amount, 19 
percent great deal)10 than its confidence in information provided by the press. Thus, both 
the media and the government have little confidence from their consumers on domestic 
anti-terrorism efforts.  
Public reaction is a strong indicator of government confidence.  Four years after 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, media coverage of Hurricane Katrina has highlighted the 
United States’ vulnerabilities in responding to large-scale incidents of mass destruction, 
be they man-made or courtesy of Mother Nature. The handling of the worst hurricane in 
U.S. history has been dismal, contributing to some of the lowest presidential approval 
ratings in history. While building government confidence will be an uphill battle on the 
heels of Katrina, it is also an opportunity to develop local policies to avoid future 
government mismanagement. 
4. Duty to Public 
Clearly, an opportunity exists for these two organizations to develop a partnership 
to improve their images while reporting significant issues during a terrorist incident, 
which may very well dictate public reaction.  Ideally, the best position is preparedness 
through public awareness and educating the public in taking a more active role against 
                                                 
8 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, The Media’s Post 9/11 Image (Pew Center 
for the People and the Press, 2005); available from http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=12. (accessed September 20, 2005).  
9 Pew Research Center, Public Views of Terrorism. 
10Ibid. 
4 
terrorism on the local front. While preventive measures are addressed in this report, the 
focal point of this thesis is on crisis response, communication, and how the media and the 
police can both help address the public’s reaction to a post-terrorist incident on U.S. soil.  
The public needs and demands the necessary information to respond accordingly. 
The more they are given, the better equipped they are to react. Given the sensitivity and 
unpredictable nature of a terrorist incident, it is imperative that authorities exercise 
careful judgment in the timing of the release of critical data and in communicating 
sufficient data. Too much information, and the manner in which it is delivered, has the 
potential to produce panic and ultimately cause more harm than the actual terrorist attack. 
5. Media Impact 
The ability to impact audiences en masse and cause panic may have first become 
obvious as a result of one of the most infamous mistakes in history. It happened on Oct. 
30, 1938, when millions of Americans tuned in to a popular radio program that featured 
plays directed by, and often starring, Orson Welles.  The performance that evening was 
an adaptation of the science fiction novel, The War of the Worlds, about a Martian 
invasion of the earth. Listeners mistakenly believed the world was being invaded by 
aliens and reacted with mass hysteria.   
The emergence of media-oriented terrorism presents a challenge to any 
democratic society and its liberal values. The threat is not limited to media manipulation 
and psychological warfare launched by a terrorist; it also includes the danger of 
restrictions imposed on freedom of the press and freedom of expression by those who try 
to fight terrorism. 
6. Challenges Ahead 
The challenges presented to democratic societies as a result of modern, media-
wise terrorists should lead to collaboration among the mass media, the administration, 
and the academic community. Only by establishing self-imposed restrictions and 





damage to the free flow of information and civil rights. This requires an open debate, 
bargaining, and negotiation among all stakeholders to reach an arrangement that will be 
in the best interest of our citizenry.11 
The United States government must collaborate with the media on a national level 
to develop an effective communication strategy that thwarts the objectives of the terrorist, 
improves government and media relations, and increases public confidence when dealing 
with a post-terrorist incident. However, breaking new ground inherently presents unique 
challenges. Therefore, instituting a national policy at this stage could be impractical 
because of legal and practical barriers (in terms of the constitutional challenges and the 
government’s inability to convince the media without cause). 
Because there are fewer variables and less complexity, the local front is a more 
feasible venue in which to develop a prototype for media policies. Success in the 
localities can pave the way for expansion on the national level.  In this post 9/11 era, it is 
critical to develop strategies that will deny terrorists the ability to harness the media in 
order to further their attempts to create public fear and effect political change. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores strategies available to the PPD and the local media outlets in 
developing a partnership to better calibrate and direct the public’s response to a terrorist 
incident or catastrophic incident. Specifically, the thesis identifies practical methods to 
reduce the inherent mistrust and begin changing a culture from need-to-know to need-to-
share.  
 
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
The PPD and local media outlets were chosen as the experiment for this thesis, 
largely because the author is a senior official in the PPD with access to information 
regarding its policies with respect to interfacing between the department and the local 
media. The objective of this thesis is to raise awareness of the media’s impact on 
                                                 
11 Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, 
no. 2 (summer 1997): 51. 
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terrorism and to develop policies/recommendations that will help reduce and/or thwart 
the terrorists’ goals of creating mass hysteria, panic, fear, and disruption to our lives. The 
focus is limited to the PPD, the Philadelphia media, and the city’s citizenry. If a 
catastrophic incident occurs, the local media will be the first to report the information and 
will then inform the national “network” news media. Focusing on the local media is 
practical and manageable in developing a consistent message to Philadelphians, who 
typically rely on the local media for immediate information.   
Philadelphia is a major city with a population of nearly 1.5 million; an additional 
1 million people visit or work in the city daily. Nestled between two heavily populated 
cities, New York and Washington, DC, Philadelphia is the birthplace of our country. It 
was once the capital of the United States where the “White House” was located for 10 
years and is home to the Liberty Bell, Independence Hall, and the Betsy Ross House. The 
country’s first two presidents, as well as Benjamin Franklin, were among the many 
dignitaries who have called Philadelphia home. The city’s rich history, population, and 
national icons make it an attractive target. 
A collaborative effort can build a strong relationship between the police and the 
media and ultimately the intended target: the public. With accurate and timely 
information, and through basic emergency preparedness, individuals will feel less 
frightened and thus be more likely to respond to incidents in a logical and practical 
manner, virtually obliterating the biggest aim of terrorism: psychological fear. This will 
help to counter the psychological impact of a terrorist attack. For example, if public 
officials fail to tell people within 30 minutes of an attack that their children are safe and 
being sheltered, it will be too late to tell parents not to pick them up.12 Large 
metropolitan police departments, like the PPD, must build trust and partnerships with 
local media outlets to mitigate potential public panic in the event of an incident. An 
approach must be found in which the media views itself as a part of this process.  
                                                 
12 Sharon Begley, “Simulations of Attacks by Terrorist Illustrate Challenge Officials Face,” Wall 
Street Journal, July 15, 2005. 
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The CP model is an example of a police/public partnership that aims to reduce 
negative reaction against either party and increase trust and confidence.13 This CP model 
may be best utilized for soliciting the support of the media and focusing the community 
on tackling some of the challenges the PPD has faced since 9/11. A strategic policy plan 
must be developed that specifically addresses public reaction to local media coverage.  
Ideally, such a policy could reduce and/or prevent mass hysteria and fear and save 
thousands of lives during a crisis. The PPD must build relationships with its local media 
before an incident occurs in order to alleviate the potential negative effects of media 
coverage. The objective of this strategy would be to lessen the effectiveness of terrorism 
through minimizing panic and improving media relations. Much like law enforcement has 
embraced the CP model and is sensitive to the needs of the community, a similar 
approach must be adopted with the media if we are to cooperate and implement potential 
findings of this study. 
The relevant audience is comprehensive and should be handled with experience. 
The PPD’s successful participation in community policing provides the necessary 
expertise and leadership to take the initiative in this partnership process. Recent history 
has shown the importance of an effective media relationship. In the DC sniper case, 
despite great panic and fear, the public had confidence in the police mainly because the 
police managed the media well, and provided timely information to the public until the 
successful apprehension of the suspects.14 In contrast, poor police and media relations in 
New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina had a significant negative impact on public 
                                                 
13Community policing is a policing philosophy that promotes and supports organizational strategies to 
address the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving tactics and 
police-community partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls for 
service with proactive problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing 
requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively 
addressing these issues. 
14Chuck Wexler, Gerard R. Murphy, Heather J. Davies and Martha Plotkin, “Managing a Multi-
Jurisdictional Case, Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation,” Police Executive Research Forum, 
(2004).   
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confidence in its police force, partly due to decimation of the police force because of the 
disaster and partly due to inaccurate reports of critical situations by the media.15  
Findings in this thesis regarding the PPD’s media policies, its relationship with 
the local media outlets, and the policy recommendations derived from these findings, 
may serve as a template for relations between police departments of other large cities and 
their media counterparts in the sphere of terrorism coverage. 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Paul Wilkinson stated that communication between the government and the media 
is an important element in any strategy to impede the terrorist’s mission from prevailing 
and to preserve democracy.16 The U.S. government’s experience is based on the 
supposition that the media’s editorial decisions regarding how they cover acts of 
terrorism have a two-pronged effect. Through vivid and shocking images, the media can 
escalate fear and panic while simultaneously providing a far-reaching venue for 
spreading the terrorists’ propaganda.  What must be realized in this process is that, 
generally speaking, bad news is good news for the media, which therefore affects the 
bottom line and thus policy. The unprecedented challenge, one unimaginable to our 
forefathers and authors of the Bill of Rights, is to cripple the manipulative tactics of 
media-oriented terrorists while honoring our basic foundation of freedom of speech. The 
bridge to media/police collaboration in the U.S. is removing or significantly reducing the 
skepticism both parties have of each other. An in-depth appreciation of the parties’ 
respective roles and procedures will promote the development of rules of engagement 
when moving forward in the post 9/11 media/police arena. Together, through training, 
education, and collaborative effort, we can have an impact on how terrorism will affect 
our consumers - the citizens of Philadelphia. 
The primary objective of terrorist acts is to create fear and to encourage divisive 
reactions. The Philadelphia media and the PPD can help in this mission through the 
                                                 
15Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors,” LA Times, September 27, 2005, 
available from http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
rumors27sep27,0,5492806,full.story?coll=la-home-headlines. (accessed January 4, 2006).  
16 Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment.” 
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careful oversight of the messages they deliver to the community at large. Modern 
terrorists have become aware of the new opportunities for exerting mass psychological 
impact using the latest means of mass communications. Several terrorist organizations 
have realized the potential of media-oriented terror in terms of effectively reaching 
enormous audiences.17 The media and the terrorists have a disjointed, symbiotic 
relationship, but it is more about the terrorists using the media to get their propaganda 
publicized than it is the willingness of the media to tout their ideals. The media needs to 
more fully recognize their duplicity in fueling the terrorist’s campaign of hatred. The 
media needs no prompting in resisting efforts at manipulation by the government; one 
can only hope they will exercise the same care in resisting manipulation by terrorists.18 
The ultimate objective and significance of this project is to illustrate that the 
American public can significantly decrease the impact of terrorism and effectively deal 
with its aftermath through trust and partnership with the police and media. This may 
subsequently reduce the attractiveness of terrorism as a tactic and thus reduce the number 
and degree of terrorist incidents.   
This thesis proposes new strategies and tactics for the PPD and the local media to 
help lessen the negative effects of media coverage of a terrorist incident in our 
community.  Emergency situations most commonly involve four phases of activity: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.19     While the media may play a role in 
all four phases, they are least important in disaster mitigation and probably most 
important in the response phase, followed by the preparation phase. In the two latter 
phases, the media becomes one of the most important sources of local and national 
information about the crisis. They can continue to work in a disseminator role, seeking 
official information about what happened and how citizens can best respond, and can also 
provide help and advice to victims.  Effective personal relationships between journalists 
                                                 
17 Robert Geffner, “The Theater of Terror: The Psychology of Terrorism and Mass Media,” Journal of 
Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma, no. 3/4 (March 25, 2004): 389. 
18 Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment.” 
19 Ford N. Burkhart, Media, Emergency Warnings, and Citizen Response (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991). 
10 
and public officials can greatly facilitate the dissemination of information.20 There are 
excellent examples of this opportunity for cooperation between government and media, 
which have been in practice for several years. Later we will explore these examples in 
other countries, such as Britain, Israel, and Australia, which may provide best practices 
for the U.S. government. 
The power of the media cannot be underestimated. The media has the ability to 
"create" an event, aid in rescue operations, alleviate or exacerbate an emergency 
situation, prejudice the outcome of an event, exaggerate or sensationalize news and affect 
public perception.21 Another important issue to consider, which complicates law 
enforcement’s ability to control a situation, is the media’s rapid response to an emergency 
situation and the speed with which information is disseminated prior to law enforcement 
assessment. Adding to the problem is the competition among news organizations to be 
the first with “breaking news,” which at times potentially leads to incompetent and trivial 
journalism marked by superficial coverage of complex issues caused by insufficient 
background reporting and use of inadequate sources. The nature of the industry puts   
tremendous pressure on journalists seeking a story. Profitability in the news industry 
frequently revolves around the acquisition of information before a competitor has it, 
stringent deadlines, and the need to fill newspaper columns, television and radio air time. 
Profitability versus integrity of a story poses a unique conundrum when considering the 
media’s motivation in getting its product to its consumers. 
A significant component of this study rests on a reciprocal understanding of the 
role of the major participants during an emergency; especially an incident with terrorist 
tentacles. Rather than view the media with suspicion, law enforcement should view the 
media as an opportunity to communicate a calm and consistent message to the public that 
will aid in controlling the situation.  
 
 
                                                 
20 Library of Congress, Media Interaction with the Public in Emergency Situations (Library of 
Congress, 1979; available from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Media_Interaction.pdf. (accessed March 
10, 2006). 
21 Ibid.  
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E. SUMMARY 
Americans follow news reports more closely since September 11. Network 
television news is no more prominent a source of information than radio or local 
television news. The media and government play a significant role in shaping the public’s 
view on terrorism. Unfortunately, public confidence in both organizations is dismal. 
Mistrust and suspicion blankets relations between the police and the media; both are 
equally responsible for the current state of affairs.  Each profession operates in an 
opposing professional environment: the police from a need-to-know and the media from a 
need-to-share. Unless sound solutions are proposed and adopted this state of affairs is a 
recipe for disaster in the post 9/11 era.  There is an inherent and ethical duty to the public 
for both organizations to resolve this conflict. This thesis explores strategies available to 
the PPD and the local media outlets for developing a partnership to better calibrate and 
direct the public’s response to a terrorist incident or catastrophic incident. The strained 
relations are not unique to Philadelphia; therefore, the proposals offered in this document 
should be geographically transferable to other municipalities. The author proposes a 
partnership between the police and the media to improve relations and public confidence 
and to reduce the inherent mistrust between the parties. The focal point of this proposal 
centers on a local crisis response and crisis communication in managing public reaction 
to reduce mass hysteria typically associated with a disaster, whether it’s a deliberate act 
or not.  The emergence of media-oriented terrorism threatens our freedom of the press 
and, as Americans, we must be mindful not to let terrorism manipulate our basic rights. 
The challenge is to maximize security while minimizing the damage to the free flow of 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will focus on the current schools of thought that guide the 
relationship among the media, the government (police), the public, and terrorists. It will 
provide some background on the balance between the current threat of terrorism and the 
media’s role and influence on the public. Specifically, this chapter will review the 
delicate issue of censorship of media-oriented terrorism that furthers terrorist objectives, 
the media’s response to terrorist activities, and the public’s role. Additionally, this section 
explores traditional community policing as a model that provides solutions during a crisis 
event.  Finally, the topics discussed in this chapter underscore the significance of 
developing a police and media partnership with the goal of reducing the psychological 
impact of a terrorist incident or similar crisis.    
 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
POLICE AND MEDIA 
Conflict between the police and the media emanates from long-standing 
constitutional, occupational, and historical factors that have served to perpetuate struggles 
between both contingents over time. First, disagreements between the two groups are 
deeply embedded in the right to free speech outlined in the First Amendment. Over time, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has limited these rights so that the right to freedom of expression 
is not absolute. For example, speech that has been deemed as libelous, obscene, or 
seditious is generally not protected under the First Amendment. As a rule, the courts have 
attempted to balance the individual’s right to free speech with the government’s 
(including the police) interest in promoting societal order and morality.22  The courts 
have continually attempted to balance the right of the press to access information that it 
deems is in the ‘public interest’ with the rights of government to maintain order. For 
instance, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the media’s right to access and 
report information relating to criminal trials, but has refrained from providing the media                                                  
22 Caeti et al, “Police-Media Relations at Critical Incidents.” 
14 
an absolute right to take pictures or publicly broadcast such proceedings.  In this regard, 
the courts have ruled that there is no “unbridgeable” First Amendment right to broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.23  
There appear to be pre-existing distinctions in personality and orientation between 
law enforcement and the media. For example, researchers conducted a survey to explore 
the predisposition and general orientation of police cadets and journalism students 
regarding their prospective professions. Their results identified several attitudinal and 
perceptual differences in the way these two groups viewed the fields of law enforcement 
and journalism, suggesting that a large degree of suspicion and a lack of trust exist 
between members of these two professions even prior to their formal entry into these 
careers.24  
 
C. CENSORSHIP  
Censorship is the control of speech and other forms of human expression.  In 
many cases (not all), it is exercised by governing bodies. The visible motive of 
censorship is often to stabilize or improve the society that the government would have 
control over.  In wartime, explicit censorship is carried out with the intent of preventing 
the release of information that might be useful to an enemy.  Generally, it involves 
keeping times or locations secret or delaying the release of information (e.g., an 
operational objective) until it is of no possible use to enemy forces.25  
Reporting acts of terrorism is a tough balancing act that requires a collegial 
relationship between the media and the government to offset the terrorist’s objectives. 
Some countries have opted to censor reports of terrorist incidents while others have 
developed policies that encourage responsible journalism. For instance, as a result of the 
July 7, 2005 London bombings, the Terrorism Act of 2006 was enacted in England which 
makes it illegal to glorify terrorism.  In 2004, the Attorney General of England warned 
                                                 
23  Caeti et al, “Police-Media Relations at Critical Incidents.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, "Censorship," available from http://www.wikipedia.com. (accessed 
July 12, 2006).  
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newspapers that they could be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act if they publish a 
memo detailing the possible U.S. bombing of the Al Jazeera news network. In Australia, 
despite the country’s pride in freedom, it lacks an explicit form of free speech. The 
Australian Communications and Media Authority are active in making recommendations 
and setting guidelines for media censoring. In Canada, the concerns of community 
standards are the primary threshold of what may be published or broadcast by the media. 
National standards are trumped by community standards, community standards are 
viewed more explicit and exact, therefore setting the standard of what is considered 
responsible journalism.26 Perhaps, through similar international policies, training, and 
cooperative effort, the U.S. may be able to develop acceptable methods in reporting acts 
of terrorism.  
At the core of this proposition are the needs of the stakeholders: the government, 
the media, and terrorists.  In the case of the government and the terrorist, each has 
opposing needs in which the media plays a pivotal role. Policymakers do not want 
terrorism, or anti-terrorism, to erode freedom of the press — one of the pillars of 
democracy. This dilemma cannot be completely reconciled; rather, it is one with which 
society will continue to struggle. The challenge for policymakers is to explore 
mechanisms that enhance media and government cooperation to accommodate the 
citizens’ and the media’s need for honest coverage while limiting the gains unhampered 
coverage may provide terrorists. We should uphold the vital principle of free speech so 
eloquently championed by Thomas Jefferson two centuries ago: “that truth is great and 
will prevail if left to her; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has 
nothing to fear from the conflict unless disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument 
and debate.”27 
Freedom of the press is one of the primary tenets of a Western democratic society. 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution lays the foundation for freedom of the 
press, stating: 
                                                 
26 Wikipedia, “Censorship.”  
27 Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment.”  
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
There exist several perspectives on censoring information. Censorship should 
never be exercised to disguise information or merely for the sake of withholding 
information. Under these conditions, it insults the public’s right to know. However, there 
are times when censoring may prove to be the obvious choice, but it must be based on 
sound principles. For instance, if information puts the country at risk, endangering 
national security, then the information should be restricted until it no longer poses a 
threat. In the crisis following 9/11 there was a strenuous government effort to withhold 
information from the press claiming disclosure would endanger national security. The 
Whitehouse urged all high-level government officials to be extraordinarily, and probably 
excessively, tight-lipped. A clear example of denying information was the Justice 
Department’s decision to deny press inquiries on detainees rounded up after the attacks, 
on the grounds that public disclosure would undermine counter-terrorism efforts.28    
The media is often in an awkward position when attempting to cover terrorist 
events. Their mission to "protect society's right to know" is often in direct conflict with 
the government's mandate to "protect and serve" and maintain order. The Harvard 
International Review argues that the government should enlist the support of 
correspondents in suppressing news by appealing to their sense of patriotism or self- 
censorship. Shortly after September 11, President Bush’s team of top advisors appealed 
to the U.S. media not to broadcast unedited video of Osama bin Laden. Ostensibly, the 
concern was that the video might reactivate “sleeper” agents in the United States by 
sending a signal. Most broadcasters supported the request.29  
There exists a precarious balancing act the press faces when covering a terrorist 
incident. During such an event, the press needs to be vigilant about balancing society's 
right to know against the media’s responsibility to inform. In the past, studies have shown 
                                                 
28 Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, “Terrorism, Censorship and the 1st Amendment: In 
Search of Policy Guidelines,” in Framing Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2003), 27. 
29 Steven Jukes, “Real-Time Responsibility,” The Harvard International Review, no. 16 (Summer 
2002): 1.  
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that most Americans support news censorship when directly related to war. However, 
some clearly distinguish between restrictions placed on international as opposed to 
domestic news. It appears that Americans are much more comfortable with the former. 
By a margin of more than five-to-one, those who believe that news from Afghanistan was 
censored favored those restrictions.30  
That is on par with the level of support for censorship measured during the Gulf 
War. By contrast, there is about two-to-one support for government censorship of news 
on home-front threats.31 Clearly, the public is of more than one mind when it comes to 
the competing interests of government and media during wartime. Censorship is favored, 
with 70 percent believing such restrictions are intended to protect the safety of U.S. 
forces rather than to cover up bad news. At the same time, a 52 percent majority endorses 
the idea that the media should aggressively pursue news rather than trust the 
government’s refusals to release information.32  In the search for a simple explanation, 
the idea that media are a contagion of terrorism has been widely heralded.  The fear of an 
epidemic of violence has been used repeatedly to justify efforts to alter media coverage, 
even though there is no significant evidence that the media act as a contagion.33 
Censoring is not left solely to the possessor of information.  It is not unusual for 
the news media to censor their coverage when they deem it essential for security interest, 
especially when they argue with the government’s objectives and face condemnation and 
economic penalties for voicing dissent.  Self-censorship generally happens quietly behind 
the scenes to avoid the impression that the media are yielding to the government’s 
demand. For example, the Washington Post acknowledged holding back publishing 
stories following the 9/11 attacks, prompted by phone calls from government 
administration officials.  The editor of the Post said that, in some instances, certain stories 
could be detrimental to national security and not instrumental to their readers, such as 
                                                 
30The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Terror Coverage Boost News Media 
Images, but Military Censorship Backed,” (Washington D.C.; Pew Center for the People and the Press, 
2001).. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan., “Reporting Terrorism,” Terrorism in Perspective (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 2003), 129. 
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methods of intelligence collection.  Shortly after 9/11 The New York Times said, “Some 
groups fear that if they are perceived as unpatriotic it will hurt them in the long run.”34 
Ironically, in the recent weeks of this writing, the New York Times has come under 
scrutiny after publishing a story disclosing intelligence information about the 
government’s effort to trace terrorists’ financial nexus. Presumably, disclosing this type 
of information creates huge hurdles for the GWOT.   
The chart depicted on the following page covers many of the issues inherent in 
this discussion. The government's and the terrorists’ objectives tend to be diametrically 
opposed, while the media's position is often a matter of judgment. “The media tends to be 
the force multiplier stuck in the middle between complete censorship and total freedom 
of the press, neither of which are in Western democracy’s long term interests. Reportage 
is inevitable and, especially if it includes unbridled speculation, false threats or hoaxes; 
coverage can advance terrorists' agendas, such as spreading panic, hurting tourism, and 
provoking strong government reactions leading to unpopular measures, including 











                                                 
34 Norris, “Censorship and the 1st Amendment.” 
35 Raphael F. Perl, “Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for 
Policymakers,” CRS Issue Brief, Oct. 22, 1997; available from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/crs-terror-media.htm.  (accessed July 10, 2005). 
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Table 1.   Analysis of Tri-Objectives Concerning Terrorist Incidents or Issues 




Government  Media Terrorist 
Advance their agenda and 
not that of the terrorist 
Be the first with the story 
 
Publicity to create fear, 
panic, and mass hysteria 
Separate the terrorist from 
the media 
Make the story as timely 
and dramatic as possible 
 
Promote propaganda and a 
favorable understanding of 
their cause 
Have the media present 
terrorists as criminals 
Freedom to cover an issue 
without external restraint, 
whether from media 
owners, advertisers, editors, 
or the government 
 
Legitimize what is often 
portrayed as ideological or 
personality feuds or 
divisions between armed 
groups and political wings 
Want the news organizations 
to provide information to 
authorities 
Be professional and 
accurate 
 
Seek media coverage that 
causes harm to their enemy 
 
Control terrorist’s access to 
outside data 
Protect the ability to operate 
as securely and freely as 
possible 
 
Seek to control smaller 
news organizations through 
funding 
Prevent the media from  
revealing  planned or current 
anti-terrorist actions 
Protect society's right to 
know 
 
Terrorist organizations  
seek to court, or place, 
sympathetic personnel in 
press positions 
Cooperation of the media in 
disseminating a ruse that 
would contribute to 
neutralizing the immediate 
threat posed by terrorists 
Play a constructive role in 
solving specific terrorist 
situations 
Cause financial damage to 







D. TERRORISM COMMUNICATION THEORY   
The emergence of media-oriented terrorism has led several communications and 
terrorism scholars to re-conceptualize modern terrorism within the framework of 
symbolic communication theory. According to Robert Geffner’s theory, terrorism as a 
symbolic act can be analyzed much like other forms of communication, consisting of four 
basic components: (a) transmitter (the terrorist), (b) intended recipient (target), (c) 
message (bombing, ambush, invasion), and (d) feedback (reaction of target audience).  
The growing use and manipulation of modern modes of communication by terrorist 
organizations have led governments and several media organizations to consider 
appropriate responses. These include limiting terrorists’ access to conventional mass 
media, reducing and censoring news coverage of terrorist acts and their perpetrators, and 
minimizing the terrorists’ capacity for manipulating the media.36   
Basic dilemmas with respect to event coverage often spark open and bitter debate 
among scholars, media organizations, and public servants. Some of the challenges that 
need to be addressed are: (a) Breaking news — how should disastrous events be 
reported? (b) How should live coverage be carried out (i.e., lessons from direct feed and 
how to curtail the spread of panic); and (c) Drawing red lines (newspaper editors) — who 
should draw them, how can they be implemented by all media organizations?37  
Journalists face difficult dilemmas in their profession, but terrorist acts present even more 
difficult choices, such as the conflicting roles of a citizen and a journalist, the clash 
between care for the victim and the duty to report, and photograph and video that affect 
public reaction. 
 
E. ROLE OF THE MEDIA  
Front page New York Times, Monday, October 31, 1938:  “Radio Listeners in 
Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact: Many Flee Home to Escape ‘Gas Raid from Mars’ 
Phone Calls Swamp Police at Broadcast of Wells Fantasy.”38  In a prescient column in 
                                                 
36  Geffner, “The Theater of Terror.”  
37  Ibid.  
38 H.G. Wells, The War of the Worlds; available from 
http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/war_worlds.html.  (accessed March 10, 2006). 
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the New York Tribune, Dorothy Thompson foresaw that the broadcast revealed the way 
politicians could use the power of mass communications to manipulate the public. “They 
have proved that a few effective voices… can convince masses of people of a totally 
unreasonable, completely fantastic proposition as to create a nation-wide panic.”39 
Journalists are well aware of the news value of terrorism, but it bears repeating, 
journalists need to be equally aware of the potential for being the terrorist’s conduit in 
delivering their propaganda.40 Reporters are supposed to remain objective and calm while 
accurately reporting the news. However, there are occasions when the magnitude of the 
incident is so great that the role of reporting becomes conflicted in moments of 
compassion for the victim, which can influence public response. For example, many can 
identify with the late ABC World News anchor Peter Jennings, when he tearfully advised 
all Americans to tell our children that we love them as he reported the devastation of the 
9/11 attacks. During his tribute, we discovered that his message touched many and helped 
refocus priorities and the importance of family values.  
Similarly, public reaction was sympathetic when a reporter tearfully interviewed a 
husband about losing grasp of his wife during Hurricane Katrina as she yelled her last 
words to take care of their children.  In contrast, media video footage of the Rodney King 
beating touched off the L.A. riots in 1992 when the police officers who allegedly 
committed the beating, were acquitted.  
Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge equated the media to first 
responders. Members of the media rush toward danger, not away from it. The media is on 
the scene to bring home the story, he argues, but there may be a time when the audience 
needs more than the story. They may need information that could be critical to 
minimizing damage and saving lives. Government officials must have a better  
understanding of the way the media will work in a crisis, what the public will need, and 
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how quickly they will need it.41 Author Steven Brill said the media should take an active 
part in educating the public about terrorism.42 
As an example of the media educating the public, the recent rise in homicides in 
Philadelphia has caused fear and anxiety within the community. A local news station took 
the initiative in an hour-long special to educate residents on the causes of these 
homicides, how to help the police solve them, what the police are doing to stop the 
violence, and how to protect themselves from becoming victims. The program did not 
levy critique or blame on the police; rather, it was a public service documentary seeking 
answers to this problem. It is too early to draw any conclusions about the impact of this 
style of local reporting, but it serves as an example of how the local media may influence 
the public, allaying fears and concerns. 
Although a bit outdated, the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident in 1979 
underscores the need for better public-sector and media relations. Significant to the 
public’s “right to know” was that many “facts” about the accident were not presented in a 
context that could be understood by the layperson.43 In the TMI incident, reactor officials 
were besieged with inquiries almost as soon as the event occurred.44 Competent 
journalists can absorb vast amounts of unfamiliar material while on the job.  That 
happened during TMI, but the effort required to make sense of the story was enormous. It 
was not like covering a political campaign or an airplane hijacking, where at least the 
vocabulary of the sources and the vocabulary of the reporters are the same.45  
In the TMI event, reporters arrived with different objectives. Some were science 
writers with an interest in the reactor. Some were medical writers with an interest in 
public health and safety. Others were sent to write “color” stories and focus on reactions 
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of citizens and evacuees. It would have been difficult under ideal circumstances for a 
public information program to serve the many needs of the reporters who covered the 
accident. Given the information program in place when the reporters arrived, it proved to 
be impossible.46Similarly, without the proper training and knowledge about the 
consequences of weapons of mass destruction, the media and the police cannot properly 
inform or instruct the public.  
Because terrorism is such a newsworthy event, according to widespread public 
belief, the media are expected to be aware of their operational role in the terror syndrome 
and to cooperate with law enforcement. Media cooperation with law enforcement in 
support of government is more likely than the media cooperation with terrorist aims.47     
In his research of police and media relations, Robert Mawby discovered a number 
of key themes that set out what might be described as the orthodox view of the police-
media relationship.  This suggests that mass media images of policing are important; they 
are a source of information on the police and, on the whole, have helped to legitimate 
police work.  Despite this, the media have had an important “watch dog” role, acting on 
behalf of the public against state agencies such as the police when propriety or justice is 
in doubt, particularly in alleged cases of miscarriages of justice.48  
The importance of the media, both as a threat to and opportunity for the police, is 
underlined by research which suggests that up to two-thirds of people find out about the 
police through the media rather than personal contact. If this is true, then communication 
through the media is a critical issue for the police service. However, there is some 
dichotomy in the media’s role.  The media are dependent on the police for the news they  
deliver; it begs the question: Can the media objectively fulfill the ability to act as a Fourth 
Estate in a watchdog role over the institutions, such as law enforcement, of a democratic 
society?  
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F. MEDIA IMPACT — EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC 
The media’s impact on the public is best summed up by a journalism professor 
Walt Seifert:   
The United States Supreme Court is not the highest in our land.  Our 
highest court is the Court of Public Opinion which meets every hour.49 
A media blackout is not the answer in guiding public reaction. Such a strategy 
weakens the very core of the First Amendment and our expectation to be informed.  
Jessica Hamblen studied the effects of news coverage during a terrorist attack and the 
addiction to being informed by news accounts. “Many people are unable to resist news 
coverage of terrorist attacks. As horrific as they are to watch on television and read about 
in newspapers and magazines, many still find it nearly impossible to turn away. It is 
difficult to know why the information is so hard to resist. Some say that people are 
hoping for information because they are fearful of future attacks and want to be prepared; 
others say that people are watching and reading in an effort to digest and process the 
event; still others say the media are intentionally creating seductive and addictive images, 
almost like those seen in an action movie. Whatever the reason, it is important to 
understand the effects on the community that this type of exposure may have. Research 
generally finds an association between watching television coverage of terrorist attacks 
and stress symptoms. However, most studies cannot answer the important question of 
whether watching television of the event makes people worse or if people who have more 
severe stress reactions are the ones who choose to watch more television coverage of the 
event.”50 
Lessons learned from democratic societies, such as Israel, about the effects of 
terrorism include the following:   
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1. Terrorism is designed to sap the moral strength of Israeli citizens and 
upset their way of life. In its threats and harmful onslaught on persons and 
property, terrorism causes moral and psychological damage. 
2. Terrorist attacks are meant to attain political aims —to change policies 
and influence political moves. To attain these aims, terrorism seeks broad 
media exposure in order to reach various target populations and spread 
fear and anxiety. 
Electronic media and the press (e.g., editors, journalists, publishers, and owners) should 
establish an ad hoc committee of media members to agree upon technical rules regarding 
media coverage of terrorist attacks, during and after their occurrence. 
In the event of a terrorist attack in Philadelphia, the Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) will be activated. The EOC, under the direction of the managing director, 
summons representatives from the various emergency response agencies to coordinate 
and properly utilize federal, state, and local resources. Through the joint information 
center, a Public Information Officer (PIO) will address the public through the media.  
 
G. MEDIA CREDIBILITY 
In the recent past, the media’s credibility has come under scrutiny. The media’s 
reputation has been harmed by scandals involving fictitious news articles in the New 
York Times, questionable documents secured by CBS, and also by general accusations of 
not being tough enough on the federal government, particularly on the question of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In a survey published by the Annenberg Public 
Policy Center in May 2005, people were asked: “In general, do you think news 
organizations get the facts straight or do you think their stories and reports are “often 
inaccurate”?” Of the 1500 respondents, 48 percent said “often inaccurate.” On top of that, 
41 percent believe that once a mistake had been made, news organizations would try to 
cover up the blunder.51  Polls show that journalism’s public image took severe blows. 
The media’s credibility suffered another blow when they hastily reported that all 
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Tallmansville, W. Virginia, miners were safely rescued from the Sago Mine. Sadly, the 
truth was tainted by the most unfortunate sort of miscommunication.   
Journalists should do their professional best to give readers, listeners, and viewers 
substantive and specific attribution to their stories. Attribution supports both accuracy 
and authenticity. As journalists, they should respectfully push their sources. Editors and 
producers should be strictly reviewing the reporters’ work to ensure a high level of 
confidence in the accuracy of the information. Ideally, professional skepticism produces 
high quality, believable reports.  
One of the biggest setbacks in the battle for media credibility came when 
Newsweek Magazine erroneously reported that U.S. interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, had flushed a copy of Islam’s holy book down a toilet in an attempt to rattle 
detainees. This discredited report resulted in eruptions of violence in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan that left 15 dead and scores injured. Despite a retraction, the damage was 
done. The Project for Excellence in Journalism, an organization dedicated to improving 
the profession, lamented the decline in media credibility in its annual State of the News 
Media report. “People have long considered the press sensational, rude, pushy, and 
callous. But in the past 17 years, they have also come to see the press as less professional, 
less caring about the interest of the country.”52  “Newsweek is directly responsible for the 
deaths of innocents and for damaging America.”53 
 
H. CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION 
The PPD’s credibility with the public and the media is paramount. It is especially 
significant during a terrorist attack. Some law enforcement personnel’s negative 
experiences with the media lead them to believe that the media often “twists” the facts in 
order to portray the police in a negative light. “The media attempt to sensationalize all of 
their stories if they can’t get the news due to the police…then the media will make up 
facts and broadcast lies to the American public.”54   
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Conversely, police officials realize the media’s involvement is both necessary for 
and an integral part of these events. They also realize the media can be utilized to their 
advantage. One law enforcement official during the Oklahoma City bombing stated, “I 
think the media is a useful tool…and it is imperative that law enforcement has a working 
relationship with the media, which at times can be confusing.”55 This confusion can be 
lessened by two factors that can create successful relations in even the most difficult 
situations. First, law enforcement executives must recognize the need for open and honest 
communications. Second, law enforcement personnel must communicate fair and 
thorough ground rules to the media in order to govern both the initial encounter and 
subsequent interactions.56   
In Oklahoma City, there was not much conflict at the site because the media were 
given some ground rules at the onset. Another source of cooperation seemed to be the 
willingness of police executives to provide timely pieces of news to the media at regular 
intervals, effectively to “give the media a bone” in order to avoid larger conflicts.57  
The PIO needs to respond quickly during an incident, to prevent confusion and to 
reduce anxiety, otherwise pandemonium can ensue. For example, during the TMI 
incident, without the proper oversight, multiple interpretations were made by the press. In 
turn, some members of Congress received different, often more speculative and 
pessimistic reports from the nuclear regulatory commission (NRC). Reporters who had 
not received this information heard it second-hand from congressional sources. As a 
result, reporters became very suspicious of the officials, especially those at the NRC. The 
utility had naively underestimated the public reaction to the accident, leading to a loss of 
credibility.58 During a biological attack, this type of irresponsible handling would 
become a breeding ground for suspicion and could significantly damage police 
credibility.  
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I. COMMUNITY POLICING (CP)  
Community policing principles have been extremely successful in Philadelphia. 
For instance, during a recent International Association Chiefs of Police conference 
officials were amazed of the lack of public outcry about the number of police shootings 
resulting in death. The Philadelphia Police Commissioner explained the openness and 
information sharing between the police and community thwarted any public outcry.59  To 
obtain this same objective, the local police should form a partnership with the media to 
create a synchronized and systematic environment in reacting to a crisis incident resulting 
in positive public response. Considering its effectiveness and success in Philadelphia and 
around the country, a model similar to community policing may serve as the template for 
police and media relations for addressing the issues raised in this thesis.   
CP was introduced to the PPD in the 1980’s as a result of series of complaints 
against the police and their poor community relations practices. Since the inception of CP 
in Philadelphia, community members have embraced a partnership concept between the 
community and the police. The PPD prides itself on CP, interfacing with people of 
diverse backgrounds and addressing issues that negatively impact the quality of life in the 
community. The PPD is one of the few departments in the United States that calls on the 
business community and residents to be active members of the Police District Advisory 
Council (PDAC). The PPD also solicits faith-based leaders to participate in a police 
clergy program. Both groups work together in cooperation with the PPD and have an 
active voice in public safety. 
 
J. PREPAREDNESS AND SOLUTIONS 
A survey concerning terrorism conducted by Penn State University regarding the 
media’s affect on the public revealed that, out of 1,000 people, nearly two-thirds of all 
respondents felt that the media had influenced their views on the importance of terrorism 
as a national problem. However, the study also revealed that the media is not effective in 
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motivating preparedness behavior.60  This is an opportunity for the media to join the 
police and take a joint proactive approach to educate the public and reduce the 
psychological effects during unfamiliar incidents. For example, an unfamiliar incident 
like a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack will be unlike any disaster 
known to most Americans. Usually, disasters do not produce panic because they involve 
familiar phenomena that are time limited and discernible to those involved in them. 
People in fires, for example, generally act responsibly, even altruistically, because they 
know about fires and receive sensory cues that enable them to assess the threat and to plan 
their escape.61 However, a chemical or, even more so, a biological incident poses a 
sudden, unanticipated and unfamiliar threat to health that lacks sensory cues, is prolonged 
or recurrent, potentially is contagious, and produces casualties that are observed by 
others. These are the factors that, historically, have spawned fear, panic, and contagious 
somatization — physical symptoms in the absence of known medical conditions. 62 
Police and the media can offset these psychological reactions. During the pre-
event phase, the public should be made to feel that it is an active participant in 
preparedness. Community organizations that serve diverse populations should be 
involved in the development and dissemination of information. It is important that the 
public be educated prior to an attack.63 In addition to instructing the public, basic 
preparedness information should be developed for and provided to professionals, faith- 
based leaders, civic organizations, and especially the media, who will interface with the 
community and can help to foster a sense of self-sufficiency. These leaders are experts in 
the needs of the community and informal resources within the community that may 
augment planned intervention.64 This collection of people may help to promote 
confidence in the plans. The public will require reassurance and optimism in addition to 
                                                 
60 Staff, “Media Sways Perception, Not Action against Terrorism," Nov. 1,2003; available from 
http://www.in.news.yahoo.com/031101/139/2914s.html. (accessed April 4, 2006). 
61 Robert L. Heath and Michael Palenchar, “Community Relations and Risk Communication,” 
Journal of Public Relations Research 12 (March 1, 2000): 131. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Adrienne Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, “Developing Strategies for 
Minimizing the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism through Prevention, Intervention, and Health 
Promotion,” National Academies Press (2003), 9. 
64 Butler et al., "Developing Strategies," 9. 
30 
instructions for personal protection and information regarding response measures from 
designated spokespersons. The key to this plan is preparedness. Both the media and the 
police department are highly skilled in dealing with disasters, but our American culture is 
largely unfamiliar with, and inexperienced in, terrorism. 
The media’s reaction must be responsible reporting. Sensationalized, irresponsible 
coverage of a massive anthrax outbreak, for example, would play into the hands of the 
bioterrorist and lead to chaos. There are times when the media must defer to responsible 
government institutions, just as automobile drivers defer to a police officer who is 
directing traffic. However, the policy of self-policing and accurate, responsible reporting 
must occasionally be followed in certain instances (e.g., bioterrorist attack), and the time 
to prepare for such reporting is now.65 
 
K. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Threats made against the U.S. and its allies make it more probable than not that 
the U.S. will experience a terrorist attack similar to 9/11 or one of greater magnitude. We 
cannot prevent all attacks; preparation is our weapon of choice in the immediate 
response. Unless we are psychologically prepared to cope with a terrorist incident we will 
fall victim to the terrorist. We must prepare in the physical sense and, equally 
importantly, in the psychological sense. To help prevent fear and limit uncertainty, the 
public should be made aware of normal psychological reactions to threats of violence, 
such as worry, anxiety, and difficulty concentrating, and how preparedness can help limit 
fear and promote effective coping.66 
Any disaster response plan should be coordinated with regional agency facilities 
(i.e., local law enforcement and civil defense agencies). This process can serve as a 
vehicle by which expert medical professionals can educate others about the potential 
impact of psychological casualties on the community, the spectrum of normal-to-
abnormal emotional reactions that may occur, and crisis intervention techniques.  
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Alternatively, if we do nothing, we fall victim to the terrorist propaganda that is fueled by 
the general public’s ignorance about terrorism and exacerbates confusion and mass 
hysteria. 
Our psychological state impacts our behavior and response. A poor or an 
abandoned psychological outlook breeds insecurity, fear, panic, distrust, hysteria, etc. 
Our culture must mirror others who work hard at reversing the negative effects of a poor 
psychological mindset. For example, the Israeli government has made a deliberate effort 
to counter the demoralizing effects of terrorism by strengthening the psychological 
coping skills of ordinary citizens. Terrorism experts visit schools throughout the country 
and provide educational programs tailored to students with the goal of lowering the level 
of anxiety and foiling one of the terrorists’ principal aims: to instill fear and undermine 
the personal security of civilians.”67 
Police, media, and community leaders must deliver a message to the public that 
limits secondary exposure. Although the evidence linking media exposure to traumatic 
events and psychological consequences correlates well, the public may benefit by 




This chapter identified several deficiencies in police and media relations. 
Historically both professions have been mistrusting and suspicious of each other. Pre-
existing distinctions between the two compounds the sterile relationship. In the absence 
of wartime information that places our troops and our homeland in imminent danger, 
censoring information stifles our freedom of expression. While some countries have 
opted to censor information, the U.S. is conscientious to ensure that we operate within the 
parameters of the constitution and encourage responsible journalism. Although 
controversial and sensitive the media has quietly proven to self-censored information that 
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may have serious consequences if release. The growing role of mass communication has 
provided terrorists with a vast array of options to promote their propaganda and the U.S. 
must minimize their capacity. Equally, the media must be conscious that they may serve 
as a conduit for the terrorist. The recent setbacks in public confidence in the media can be 
overturned by responsible and ethical standards. The media has been equated to first 
responders.  Therefore, there may be a time when the public may need more than a story; 
the public may need information critical enough to save lives. The government must 
embrace how the media operates in times of crisis and leverage it to deliver the desirable 
message to the public.     
The media must take an active part with the government in educating the public 
about the effects of terrorism. Failure to do so misinforms the public, breeds mass 
hysteria, and can be fatal. CP models exist that may serve as an ideal template in 
developing better police and media relations. Community organizations have proven to 
be a valuable asset in times of crisis and should not be overlooked as part of the 
preparation strategy. These community members and proven international educational 
programs may be the necessary panacea in combating and coping with the psychological 
impact of an incident.  
In the next few chapters, the author takes on the challenge of addressing these 
deficiencies, offering recommendations, and developing newer methods which promote 
efforts in: 
• Reducing tension between the police and the media  
• Collaboration with the stakeholders during a crisis  
• Utilizing the CP model approach in maintaining a partnership 
• Creating a reservoir of goodwill for the public 
• Establishing some preliminary guidelines between the police and the media  
• Recognizing the media’s impact on the public 
• Effective crisis communication 
• Establishing a training curriculum which enhances police and media relations   
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III. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The specific issue before us is how the media should cover and report on 
terrorism immediately following an incident. The controversial and sensitive question is 
who should decide how the media goes about its business. This chapter will review 
comparative studies on how media and government relations affect crisis management 
within the United States and internationally. Additionally, this chapter will compare and 
contrast U.S. public awareness strategies and mitigation response with other countries. 
Included in this section is a systematic review of proven national and international 
collaboration policies and training programs between both industries to identify best 
practices for local government. 
 
B. U.S. CASE STUDIES 
This section examines the role and impact of the media in emergency situations 
by comparing four cases in the United States: the 1992 L.A. riots vs. the 1979 TMI 
nuclear accident and the 1993 WTC attack vs. the 1995 Oklahoma City terrorist 
bombings.69   Despite the obvious differences among these events, a comparison of the 
role of the media and their interaction with the public in all four cases reveals several 
common themes, each of which demonstrates a range of media responses.70  
1. A Case of Exaggeration/Sensationalized News and How the Media 
Can Create an Event  
Perhaps one of the most sensationalized media events was that of the accident at 
TMI in 1979. A nationally televised report indicated that TMI faced the considerable 
uncertainties and dangers of the worst nuclear power plant accident of the atomic age. 
The specter was raised of perhaps the next most serious kind of nuclear catastrophe — a 
massive release of radioactivity. Nothing could have been further from the truth. An 
unfortunate contributor to this misinformation was that the utility and the NRC did not 
anticipate, nor were they prepared to deal with the public about, a serious, prolonged                                                  
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nuclear accident. Utility spokesmen offered explanations that were confusing and often at 
odds with the views of the NRC. Journalists' accounts reflected the confusion of their 
sources and at times bordered on sensationalism.71 
Conflicting statements brought swarms of reporters to TMI to probe what looked 
like an industry cover-up. Communications failings by the nuclear industry and media 
produced confusion among local residents, heightening the public's difficulties in 
understanding radiation and evacuation. 
TMI is in contrast to the L.A. riots, which illustrated how the media can create an 
event. From beginning to end, the L.A. riots were a media spectacle. The repeated airing 
of the beating of Rodney King, intensified by deep-seated grievances in South Central 
Los Angeles, effectively paved the way for violence. News of the acquittal of the four 
police officers involved in the beating of Rodney King set off rioting by African-
American, Hispanic, and some white residents of South Central Los Angeles. Televised 
images of street scenes acted as guides to looters and helped to propel the rioting. The 
impact of videotaping was particularly noteworthy; it was through this medium that 
images of the beatings of Rodney King and Reginald Denny were seared into the nation's 
collective psyche.72  
Reporting in the Los Angeles Times appeared more restrained than television 
coverage, but both broadcast and print media engaged in controversial and 
sensationalized reporting,73 which compares well with TMI. Such coverage led many 
people across the nation to fear that the lawlessness in Los Angeles might spread to their 
neighborhoods, while reports from TMI in contrast became more of a catalyst for hysteria 
about radioactivity. 
2. Media as an Aid in Rescue Operations can Alleviate, Exacerbate or 
Prejudice the Outcome of an Event. 
Directly following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the actions of 
the media had powerful effects on three distinct groups of people and illustrated the ways 
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in which the media can alter a crisis situation. First, radio and television served as sources 
of emergency information for victims before and during the evacuation of the towers. 
Second, in some cases the media directly hindered investigators as they did their jobs. 
Third, press reports on the explosion played a role in determining how the general public 
reacted to the situation, thus increasing or decreasing the likelihood of mass panic.74 
Many of the victims trapped inside the WTC after the bombing were able to 
watch television news, listen to radio broadcasts, and even call newscasters directly. The 
media was able to give people a wide range of emergency information. "Throughout the 
afternoon and evening, New York City newscasters gave out emergency phone numbers, 
urged calm on those trapped inside, and praised the work of the city's emergency crews," 
the New York Times wrote the day after the explosion.75 The efforts of the television 
studios to provide information to victims in New York and similar efforts in Oklahoma 
City to locate relatives of the injured and collect relief supplies are examples of how mass 
media can alleviate suffering and promote rescue operations. 
In contrast, a potentially more harmful episode took place when media reports 
revealed that investigators had linked the WTC explosion to a yellow Ford van rented 
from a Ryder franchise in New Jersey. The report did not name the man who had rented 
the van, but it did report the address of the Ryder office and the fact that the van had been 
reported stolen.76 The report forced investigators to arrest Mohammed Salameh 
immediately, although they would have preferred to keep him under surveillance in the 
hope that he would lead them to co-conspirators. The arrest cost them possible leads on 
other suspects and demonstrated the ability of news reporting to force the hand of 
investigators in the midst of their work.77 
Finally, the general tone of the bombing coverage varied greatly among media 
outlets. Predictably, the tabloid press displayed the greatest tendency to play to readers' 
                                                 
74 Congress, Media Interaction with the Public in Emergency Situations. 
75 Elizabeth Kolbert, “News Coverage Plays Central Role in Story,” New York Times, February 27 
1993. 
76 Shirley E. Perlman, “Focus on Stolen Van,” Newsday, March 4, 1993.  
77 Ralph Blumenthal, “Insistence on Refund for a Truck Results in an Arrest in Explosion,” New York 
Times, March 5, 1993.  
36 
worst fears. Most reputable newspapers and networks exercised caution in their reporting 
of the bombings. However, in some cases, respected newspapers and networks also 
resorted to alarmist speculation. The media quoted federal authorities describing the 
bombing as "the single most destructive act of terrorism ever committed on U.S. soil." 
This statement is accurate only if destruction is measured in financial terms rather than in 
terms of loss of life.78 This casting of the bombing as the first event of its kind in U.S. 
history seems designed to heighten viewer hysteria. 
3. Media Impact on Public Perception 
In contrast to the WTC bombing, in Oklahoma City media speculation about 
Middle Eastern terrorists began within hours of the explosion. Two years after the WTC 
bombing, Americans were eager to blame foreigners because it was too painful to look 
closer to home. There was little evidence to support stories that suggested Islamic 
terrorists had bombed the building. CNN went so far as to name suspects without any 
evidence whatsoever of their involvement; CBS singled out terrorists from Hamas, the 
militant Palestinian organization, without corroboration. Such accusations amounted to 
scapegoat-hunting as the press and the public groped for answers. Suspicion of Middle 
Eastern terrorists led to harassing phone calls, vandalism, and acts of hate against Middle 
Eastern residents in the United States. Even law enforcement agencies succumbed to the 
Middle East terrorist hysteria. They pursued several suspects from the region to London, 
even though officials lacked solid evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the alleged 
offenders. When the prime suspect turned out to be a white American, the attention 
focused on antigovernment militia despite the fact that there was no evidence supporting 
such a conclusion.79 
The media and public's quick assumptions that this horrific act of terrorism had 
Middle East origins quickly channeled the country's grief and anger into hate. Bomb 
threats, harassing phone calls, and acts of vandalism against the innocent occurred, much 
like in response to the 1993 WTC bombing.80  
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In summary, the lessons learned from these four cases illustrate the impact the 
U.S. media has when reporting events and how the American public is informed, but also 
how people can be misled with half-truths and sensationalism. 
 
C. PUBLIC AWARENESS — AN OVERSEAS COMPARISON   
Public awareness is a key component of crisis management. Establishing and 
maintaining a common operating procedure and ensuring cooperative relationships are 
the principle goals of effective communications and information management.81 
Preparation, practice, and response to a catastrophic incident should not be limited to the 
police and media. It should be expanded to a larger audience to obtain the maximum 
result during a crisis. Unfortunately, the U.S. preparation strategies are limited to the 
much confused, color-coded warning system, fragmented interviews of government 
officials, and a poorly advertised website, www.ready.gov.  Best practices also can be 
learned from other countries.  
In contrast to the U.S., the British government uses a "commonsense" campaign 
to inform people about the best way to respond to a terrorist attack through television and 
brochure mailings to every household to advise people about how best to respond to a 
terrorist attack. The anti-terrorist brochure is designed to provide practical advice that 
covers the basics of first aid, how to respond in the workplace to a major incident, and 
what to have on hand in case of an emergency. This emergency could be a terrorist 
attack, a major fire, a flood, or a situation where someone needs help. The origination of 
this idea arose from a similar initiative in Australia in which the government sent a 
booklet to every home, explaining what to do in the event of a terrorist attack and 
warning people to look for suspicious vehicles, people purchasing large quantities of 
fertilizer, and "unusual videotaping" of official buildings.82 The Australian $15m (US 
$9m) campaign involved packs that included a refrigerator magnet bearing an anti-
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terrorist hotline number, with instructions on assembling a survival kit, making 
emergency plans to collect children from school, and checking on elderly neighbors.  
Both governments’ campaigns include television, press, transit and outdoor 
advertising, and advertising in 33 languages other than English. The government targeted 
business owners, especially critical infrastructure entities, to ensure they were adequately 
protected.  
The Australian government specifically insists on using all forms of mass media 
(e.g., television, radio, newspapers, and the internet) to provide critical information and 
advice on protecting the nation against terrorism. Among the governments’ objectives 
during an emergency are to ensure that citizens remain calm and to reassure them that the 
government is effectively addressing the threat.83 
One of the most proven strategies for educating the public following a 
catastrophic event may rest with preparation models from England and Australia, where 
government campaigns focus on direct contact with the public through the media to 
disseminate information concerning terrorist incidents. The world witnessed an excellent 
example of media/government cooperation during the July 7, 2005, bus and train 
bombings in London. The media focused on the citizens resolve to return to “life as 
normal,” while the police periodically kept the public informed and allayed fears. Images 
on television depicted people returning home from work on the day of the bombings, like 
any ordinary day. This provides a powerful statement to the terrorists. Life was 
temporarily disrupted but not frozen.   
As the investigation matured, the police located some co-conspirators and even 
though the media knew the precise location the terrorists occupied, at the request of the 
police, they held back, not filming until the police could make the arrest. Only then did 
the media swarm in for their exclusive pictures and video. It was a brilliant example 
demonstrating how cooperation allowed both parties to get what they wanted without 
impeding the arrest or slowing media coverage. 
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D. HOW TO MITIGATE AFFECTS OF TERRORISM 
Americans can lessen the impact of future terrorism by learning to respond more 
objectively to future malicious acts. As we obsessively and excessively beef up internal 
security and try to dismantle terrorist groups worldwide, Americans actually feed the 
terrorists' purposes.84 It could be as important to combat our emotional vulnerability to 
terrorism as it is to attack al Qaeda. 
By minimizing our negative reactions, we might undermine terrorists' goals as 
effectively as by waging war on them or by mounting homeland defenses. As former 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt so famously stated, "The only thing we have to fear is 
fear itself." We can help ensure that terrorists don't win if we can minimize our fears and 
react more constructively to future terrorism. This option is not easy, nor will it suffice 
alone. It may not even be possible. Yet human beings often best succeed by being 
rational when their emotions, however tenacious and innate, have let them down.  
For a few days following the July 7 London transit bombings the number of riders 
was slightly below average. The transportation system recovered quickly, and within a 
couple of weeks, the numbers were back to normal. In contrast, for a year after the 9/11 
attacks, Americans were still profoundly reluctant to board airplanes. As a result, 
Americans chose the roadways as their alternative mode of transportation, which led to a 
rise in traffic deaths of more than 1,200 when compared to the previous year’s statistics. 
According to Professor Garrick Blalock at Cornell University, “the response to terrorism 
can often have consequences that rival the affects of the act itself.”85   One constructive 
antidote to post-9/11 trauma is to enhance the information available and to foster 
judicious appreciation, evaluation, and use of the information. Life is inherently risky, 
unpredictable, and subject to variables we cannot know, but there are factors we do know 
and can understand. Rather than inciting people’s fears about sharks, serial killers, and 
anthrax, the mass media could help people understand genuine risks in their everyday 
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environments and activities.86 Much like the Israeli system, our educational institutions 
should help students develop critical skills necessary to make rational choices.87 While 
avoiding intrusions into personal liberties, government could nevertheless collect and 
assess statistical data in those arenas (such as air travel) considered potential targets, 
concentrating protective efforts and law enforcement where it is most efficacious.  
The goal, researchers say, is to get people to view the threat of terrorism as a 
calculated risk rather than as an event to avoid at all costs because dread incites panic and 
irrational behavior. “Governments need to give people an accurate assessment of risk to 
help them, because we know people react in ways that are often wildly irrational,” said 
Gary LaFree, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism at the University of 
Maryland.  For example, Spaniards took the more rational approach after the Madrid train 
bombing in March 2004; the number of riders dropped for just two months (though this 
might be because the new Spanish government decided to pull its troops out of Iraq and 
this perhaps created a sense among Madrid’s riders that their city was no longer a 
terrorist target). There was no rise in driving; hence, no additional traffic deaths.88  The 
Spanish government helped promote a positive response and the trains continued to 
operate on time. The day after the bombing, train ridership was four times higher than 
normal as Spaniards attended huge antiterrorism demonstrations.89 The U.S., by contrast, 
chose to ground air traffic for several days after 9/11, possibly fostering undesirable 
effects. 
Since 9/11, there has been a tremendous interest in the never ending GWOT. The 
media plays a significant role in reporting international efforts related to the GWOT and 
the impact such information has on the American public. As these images and 
information are released, Americans become painfully aware of their vulnerability to 
terrorism. However, there is good news on the GWOT front. There has been successful 
counterterrorism measures employed recently in Europe.  Since the 2004 bombings in 
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Madrid, authorities across the Atlantic Ocean have escalated counterterrorism efforts, 
making hundreds of arrests and foiling several large scale plots.90  As of the recent 
writing of this report on August 9, 2006, British authorities prevented a terrorist plot of 
significant magnitude that some have described as larger than 9/11. 
Despite successful counterterrorism measures, about 41 percent of Americans feel 
that neither international allies, nor the U.S. is winning the war on terrorism.91 Although 
international authorities continue to effectively fight terrorist operatives, the media 
reminds us of our vulnerabilities back at home on an almost daily basis. However, despite 
this significant poll rating government officials and the media should still use these 
international accomplishments to parlay U.S. interventions and collaborative efforts with 
other countries to make America safer. Successful U.S. intervention deserves substantial 
media attention, and the government should be a driving force in ensuring that these 
messages are delivered to the public.  
   
E. GUIDELINE 
Journalists know the news value of terrorism, but they are also aware of their role 
as envoys of the fear, threats, and messages terrorists wish to promulgate.92 A wide range 
of people have suggested ways by which the media might address the problems inherent 
in covering terrorist incidents. Some have suggested that there be no live coverage of an 
incident in progress. Others have proposed formal guidelines, perhaps offered by the 
government, voluntarily set up by news organizations, or by the two working in concert. 
For example, during the Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) conference in Israel, media 
and government officials discovered the following: 93 
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• The heightening of fear in the public due to media reports, both at the scene of 
terrorist attacks and in the aftermath, may play into the hands of terrorist 
organizations and encourage them to continue their activities with even more 
zeal. 
• All agencies involved in the shaping of public opinion (i.e., politicians, public 
figures, media people, academics, educators, etc.) must contribute their share 
to the minimization of the moral–psychological damages of terrorism.  
• Methods and guidelines must be formulated that will, on the one hand, enable 
the media to go on playing their crucial role in a democratic society of 
reporting freely and without external interference and, on the other hand, 
restrict the extent of the damages to people’s sense of personal safety and to 
public morale.  
 
Israel’s government and local media downplay terrorist incidents to a minimum, 
focusing more on quick response, recovery, and the coping process and less on the actual 
incident. Other experts suggest crisis role playing, training, and educating the media.94 
As an example, the Metropolitan Police Department (Scotland Yard) has had success 
composing and developing good media relations. Both train together for large-scale 
events, such as a terrorist incident, and understand each other’s roles and responsibilities. 
This formal training builds mutual rapport and trust.  This has been accomplished through 
development of a mutual agreement as described below:  
 
• Media are not allowed to photograph the dead or injured, or the scene itself, in 
an uncoordinated and unsupervised fashion. 
• A press assembly point is established outside the outer cordon and an officer 
detailed to ensure they remain at that location until allowed supervised access.  
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• A representative from the Public Affairs Office (PAO) attends as soon as 
possible, but no comment is made by police without the authority of the 
highest ranking commander and after consultation with the coordinating 
group. 
• No comment about the numbers of injured or police action is made in 
conversation with press or TV representatives. Police and the PAO must bear 
in mind the probability of television cameras transmitting live pictures on the 
electronic news gathering system and so possibly alerting other terrorists of 
the precise scene or causing undue distress to the public. 95 
 
George Washington University has adopted a model similar to Scotland Yard’s 
for training government and the media during a crisis. In Philadelphia, Temple University 
hosted the first ever media and first responder training in March 2006, which specifically 
addressed how both groups should communicate during a terrorist incident.     
The greatest strength Israel and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have is that each 
enjoys a national police force run by one government under a centralized model. Because 
of this centralization, policies and procedures are easily disseminated and monitored to 
meet the intended outcome. Police and media relations are formed to collaborate in ways 
that make information available to the public in a synchronized and systematic fashion.  
However, one disadvantage is the availability of the vast government players to respond 
to media inquiries. It is enormous and, at times, far beyond the local authorities’ 
capabilities to stifle government reaction. While this is a weakness in a national process, 
it can be controlled in a local response by instituting a policy limiting response to a select 
few delivering a consistent message (i.e., mayor, police commissioner, PIO, etc.).  
In sharp contrast to the above examples, in the TMI incident authorities were ill-
prepared and inexperienced in dealing with the media during a crisis. Basic public 
information techniques, such as setting up a press center where reporters could gather and 
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question sources, holding regular press conferences, and providing background 
information kits and graphics, were virtually neglected in the heat of the crisis.96  Due to 
these shortcomings, misleading rumors that radiation had leaked into the community 
festered, causing unwarranted panic, stress, and concern.   
Paul Bremer, the former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, said, 
“After considerable reflection, I believe that U.S. law and custom, our country's profound 
commitment to freedom of the press, and the individual circumstances of each terrorist 
incident make it impractical to develop universally accepted guidelines on media's 
response to terrorism.”97 However, he argues giving extensive coverage to terrorist 
statements may well encourage future acts of terrorism.98 It is encouraging to see that 
responsible journalists are paying increasing attention to the impact their actions have on 
terrorism. Some major news organizations have set up specific internal guidelines for 
handling terrorist incidents.  One example of an improvement in the situation was the 
decision by the major networks to decline to broadcast a videotape made in March 1988 
by one of the hostages in Lebanon.  The substance of what was said was reported, but the 
tape itself — obviously a cynical attempt by the kidnappers to advance their demands —
was not aired.99 Similarly, Robert Long, KNBC News Director, Burbank, California, 
chose not to air a live shooting death during a police chase on May 11, 2005, despite the 
temporary rating drop.   
Terry Anderson, the journalist who was taken hostage and eventually released by 
the Islamic Jihad in the 1980s, said, “General guidelines too often do not fit all cases. 
Certainly, we should not allow, or implicitly approve censorship by government officials, 
who will try to impose censorship in any case. Public approval of their acts simply 
encourages an even heavier hand.”100 
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News coverage also fosters irrational reactions, researchers have said, as graphic 
images and live television broadcasts reinforce the message of terror. On September 11, 
the world listened in on last desperate cell phone calls to loved ones and watched blood 
spattered office workers fleeing Manhattan. Despite the high toll of deaths and injury in 
the attack on the London Underground (Tube), the British news generally showed little in 
the way of gore. On the BBC, the standard image was a map of London and the Tube, 
with an “X” indicating each explosion. “Terrorism is theater, and it thrives only where 
there is open media…the more coverage, in some ways the more it plays into the hands 
of the terrorists.”101  
 
F. POLICE AND MEDIA STRATEGIES 
A number of strategies, none without costs or risks, exist for enhancing the 
effectiveness of government/media-oriented responses to terrorism, and for preventing 
the media from furthering terrorist goals as a byproduct of vigorous and free reporting.102 
However, these strategies are not likely to be very effective unless the United States, like 
Britain and Australia (who have sought to deny the terrorist direct access to the important 
platform of the broadcast media), is open to thinking outside the proverbial box to 
effectively win this campaign. Therefore, the following alternatives/policy 
recommendations should be considered:  
1. Training  
a. Use expert advisers from both disciplines to avoid questions or reports that 
might exacerbate a terrorist situation; this training should encompass how to 
effectively communicate to the public.  
b. Publicize the ongoing training, preparedness, and successful interagency 
partnerships which can “raise the costs” for terrorists and have a positive 
effect on deterrence. 
c. The anti-media bias expressed by police is often born out of ignorance. 
Modifying the attitudes of department personnel toward the media should 
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begin with recruits at the police academy and continue through in-service 
training. The department cannot ignore or throw up their hands in 
exasperation. It must take the initiative in changing the mindset. Until officers 
and police executives are educated about the effect the media can have on the 
department, the power of the media works against the police rather than for it. 
In the same vein, media administrators and journalism schools should follow 
suit.  
 
The training program should include the following ten C’s of good 
communication,103 which will produce confidence in the system and in the officials 
running the operation:  
1. Be Cooperative  
2. Provide Control 
3. Demonstrate Care and Concern 
4. Exhibit Competence 
5. Be Credible 
6. Be Consistent 
7. Be Clear 
8. Be Concise 
9. Keep Current 
10. Act Calm 
At the same time, we need to be mindful of keeping to the principles of “Dealing 
with the HEAT.” The pressure of the incident, inherent in any critical situation, obviously 
creates panicky reactions. To lessen that likelihood, the PIO should maintain eye contact 
and consider the following model when dealing with the media:104 
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H — Hear them out; listen carefully to their questions; do not interrupt or jump to  
          conclusions. 
E — Empathize; validate what they are saying; if you don’t have the answer, tell  
          them, and get back to them when you do know. 
A — Apologize for any confusion, misinformation or any adverse situation 
T — Take action to help resolve or soften any problems 
2. Professional Conduct 
• A mutual agreement is necessary between the local government and the media 
that establishes a binding code of behavior or guidelines that editors and 
reporters can access for guidance. Even if specific guidelines are not adopted, 
such focus would increase understanding in the public and press policy 
communities about the need for responsible journalism.105 
• The approach most favored by responsible mass media organizations is 
voluntary self-restraint in an attempt to avoid the dangers of manipulation and 
exploitation by terrorist groups.106 
• Many major media organizations have adopted guidelines for their staff with 
the aim of preventing the more obvious pitfalls. For example, CBS News 
guidelines commit the organization to “thoughtful, conscientious care and 
restraint in its coverage of terrorism, avoiding giving an excessive platform 
for the terrorist/kidnapper, no live coverage of the terrorist/kidnapper (though 
live on-the-spot reporting by CBS News reporters is not limited thereby); 
avoiding interference with the authorities' communications (e.g., telephone 
lines); using expert advisers in hostage situations to avoid questions or reports 
that might exacerbate the situation; obeying all police instructions (but 
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the news); and attempting to achieve such overall balance as to length so that 
the (terrorist) story does not unduly crowd out other important news of the 
hour/day.”107  
• There is no argument that cooperative relationships between the authorities 
and the media are essential for an effective police/media relations policy. 
However, the media should police itself to some degree. Media outlet 
manager-editors, publishers, and owners should establish an ad hoc committee 
of media members to agree upon technical rules regarding media coverage of 
terrorist attacks, during and after their occurrence. Formulating a program that 
will help identify propaganda manipulation by terrorist organizations will 
stress the importance of standing up to this manipulation as part of the overall 
fight against terrorism. One of the components of the program is a seminar to 
train media personnel and journalists who cover terrorist attacks (senior and 
novice) to provide critical and balanced coverage of attacks.108 
3. Media Center  
• An authorized body should be created to which media representatives can turn 
for reliable online information regarding terrorism on an ongoing basis, as 
well as during terrorist attacks.  
• During a crisis incident we should consider use of a proven public 
warning/alert system to issue specific statements through the media in a 
coordinated manner. The Community Alert Network (CAN), an emergency 
notification system, allows the media to utilize a 24/7 operations center that 
assists the police in composing a succinct message that is quickly dispersed to 
those who need to know.109  
• Another alternative is to utilize the services of independent crisis management 
consultants. For example, Audience Central (www.audiencecentral.com) 
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developed PIER (Public Information and Emergency Response) to respond at 
a moments notice to meet the high demand for fast, accurate, and direct 
information. In an instant, this organization can remotely construct a public 
information notice on the organization’s website for the media, providing 
additional time for the PAO and the organization [police] to concentrate on 
the latest developments.  
• Another option is for Congress to consider establishing a permanent 
government terrorist information response center. Such a center, by agreement 
with the media, could have a rapid reaction terrorism reporting pool on call 
(through communication links), composed of senior network, wire service, 
and print media representatives. Network coverage of incidents would then be 
coordinated by the network representative in the center. Such a center could 
be headed by a government spokesperson (the Terrorism Information 
Coordinator) who would promptly seize the information and any initial 
communiqués from terrorists. Too often, when incidents happen in the United 
States, there is a vacuum of news other than the incident itself, and by the time 
the government agencies agree on and refine what can be said and what 
position is to be taken, the government information initiative is lost.110  
 
G. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER’S ROLE  
The PIO serves a crucial role in the organization, especially in times of a crisis. 
The PIO is often the individual the media has the most contact with in representing the 
organization’s position. This established role perpetuates the significance of maintaining 
good public relations. The following strategies should be considered by the PIO when 
addressing the media: 
• The first message is the most important message. The information must be 
clear and it must be accurate. Impressions are formed immediately. There 
must be one spokesperson, the PIO, who gets the information to the public. 
The PIO must adhere to principles of repetition, regularity and consistency. 
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That is, information must be regularly reported with consistency; factual 
information should provide a well-shaped perception; and the information 
should be robust and withstand later disclosure.  
• The PIO does not need to be an expert on the subject matter; however, part of 
the crisis plan should include bringing experts in and knowing when to call 
upon them to clarify any informational issues that might arise. In the TMI 
incident, there was no unambiguous evidence of a cover-up, but some utility 
officials showed a marked capacity for self-deception, and others hid behind 
technical jargon to obscure answers to troublesome questions.111    
• Updates from the PIO at regular intervals are critical. Conducting unified 
briefings with other critical personnel and decision makers is essential.  The 
PIO must remain calm, and provide clear and concise instructions, at all times. 
• The PIO should build relationships between the PPD and the local media in 
advance to familiarize key representatives with operations and chain of 
command. Involve the media in exercises on how and why to disseminate 
information. Establish a forward media command post with links to 
headquarters. Conduct regular updates, hold on- and off-camera briefings, 
and, lastly, provide them a tour of the incident site.112  
All of these suggestions promote a cohesive, hand-in-glove relationship between 
both organizations. We must be mindful not to neglect the political fallouts that may 
occur from watchdog groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). This 
or other groups may view police and media partnerships as a form of censorship or a 
tactic to control the media, which denies the public the right to know and to have free 
access to information. However, new strategies utilized by our government weaken this 
argument. For example, responding to pressure from the country's news media who were 
disappointed by the level of access granted during the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2001 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the United States military initiated a partnership concept 
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with the Embedded Journalist Program.113 The military offered journalists the 
opportunity to undergo a period of boot-camp style training before being allowed into the 
combat zone. Whether the news accounts of the GWOT are positive or damaging, 
embedded journalists continue to provide Americans with updates to keep the public 
informed.  A similar embedded model should be entertained by the PPD during a terrorist 
incident. The likelihood of offsetting criticism from the ACLU and other watchdog 




In the first half of this chapter, the author discussed comparative case studies 
within the United States and overseas on media response to a crisis and its effect. In the 
U.S., several cases emphasized on how the media can 1) exaggerate or sensationalize 
news and their impact in creating an event; 2) be an aid in rescue operations in which 
they can alleviate, exacerbate, or prejudice the outcome of an event; and 3) impact public 
perception. The lessons learned from the four cases illustrate the influence of the media 
in reporting and how people can be misled with limited information.  
Public awareness is critical during a crisis, and preparedness is a necessary 
ingredient. Unfortunately public awareness preparation strategies in the U.S. are limited. 
Overseas governments, on the other hand, employ a strategy of how the public should 
respond to an attack through public service announcements on television and through 
brochure mailings to every household. Businesses and critical infrastructures are also 
included in the preparedness strategy. Overseas strategies such as these can aid America 
in mitigating the affects of a terrorist incident. Furthermore, educational programs like 
those exercised in Israel can help America develop better coping skills to make rational 
choices during a crisis.  Successful U.S. intervention requires public exposure with a 
confident message that the government is forcefully protecting our homeland.  
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In the second half of this chapter, the author looked at guidelines for the police 
and media. Although sweeping guidelines are impractical; some preliminary guidelines 
should be developed between the two organizations to ensure the proper message is made 
available to the public in a timely and accurate manner. Ideally, one spokesperson should 
be the sole communicator during a crisis.  Other strategies discussed in this chapter 
covered training programs, exercising professional conduct (including responsible 
journalism and voluntary self-restraint), and working with a media center to help 
disseminate information. The author discussed the PIO’s critical role in representing the 
organization’s position and the willingness to cooperate with the media should be 
apparent. The PIO’s relationship with the media and openness in providing the necessary 
information provides a well organized public perception of the government’s response to 
a crisis. In the following chapter the methodology of the experiment conducted by the 
author to test some of these hypotheses will be discussed followed by the research 




This research entailed surveys and interviews of a diverse group of individuals 
with varying degrees of background relevant to this thesis, yet homogeneous enough to 
capture any recurring themes. Relationships between the author and participants varied. 
The author’s experience with some participants spanned more than 21 years of law-
enforcement experience, while he had no prior interaction with others.  The participants 
for each group were comprised as follows: 
• Law enforcement: Philadelphia police commanders; nearly all with 20 or 
more years of law enforcement experience who have worked throughout the 
city. Their knowledge covers a variety of disciplines (i.e., public affairs, 
patrol, detective division investigators, crime scene investigations, internal 
investigations, communications, narcotics investigations, and homeland 
security). Included in this group was the former chief of police of Portland, 
Maine, who is currently the chief of police for Upper Darby Township, 
Pennsylvania. In addition, there was also a special agent from the Philadelphia 
FBI office, responsible for all media and public affairs in the area. 
• Media: Twenty journalists (i.e., reporters, editors, producers, and managers) 
covering the different media outlets in the Philadelphia market (e.g., 
television, radio, print, and internet). Their experience ranges from 10-30 
years of reporting on a variety of critical incidents such as Hurricane Katrina, 
the September 11th attacks, the DC sniper attacks, the New York blackout, 
daily crime occurrences, etc. 
• Community: Twenty-five community leaders, including neighborhood block 
captains, members from the business community, police district advisory 
council (PDAC) members, police clergy, elected officials, and community 
activists from central, north, and west Philadelphia. Councilpersons 
represented north and west Philadelphia; another represented the city at large.   
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The goal was to develop a policy designed to serve the interests of local 
government, the media, and the public, while recognizing the dynamics of a terrorist 
enterprise. Additionally, the focus group exploration should produce opportunities to 
convene forums where participants can discuss issues of common interest.114 
 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Study limitations included a small sample group of the general population 
identified in this report. The participants in section A consisted of the 65 individuals; the 
geographic boundary area represents the publication, listening, and viewing audience 
specific to and surrounding the city of Philadelphia.  The results should not be interpreted 
as a generalization for all police, media outlets, and the American people. The group in 
this study is a sample of convenience and may not capture all ideas of the larger group 
within the metropolitan area.  
 
C. INSTRUMENTATION 
The instrument used to gauge all of the participant’s response was a survey 
questionnaire; followed by six questions for the police and media in a focus group 
setting. The questions specifically addressed reporting practices, relationship experiences 
between the two groups, and training (refer to appendix A for a sample of the 
instrument).115 The community group participated in two focus group questions 
regarding reporting practices of the police and media. Each stakeholder group 
participated in a questionnaire consisting of 14-16 multiple-choice and yes-or-no 
questions.116 These questions were designed to capture the participant’s interpretation of 
his or her relationship with each respective group (media, police, and community) and his 
or her views on collaborating on crisis management training. The survey questionnaire 
also aimed at collecting focus opinions about each group’s value in developing a 
                                                 
114 E. Stringer and W.J. Genat, Action Research in Health, Gathering Data: Sources of Information 
(Upper Saddle River: Pearson Press, 2004), 69.  
115 Police and media participated in six focus group questions and the community participated in two 
focus group questions.  
116 Questions 7 and 8 from the police &media survey were omitted in the community survey. Both 
questions referred to specific job responsibility and were irrelevant for the community to participate.   
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partnership.  Immediately following the questionnaire, follow-up focus group discussions 
were conducted to elaborate on the issues and themes that were initially identified and to 
obtain optimal solutions through group consensus. 117  Focus group interviews, when 
conducted carefully and used appropriately, promise to provide a rich, new way of 
gathering qualitative evaluation information.118 
 
D. PROCEDURE 
The media were the first to be interviewed, followed by the police, and, finally, 
the community leaders. Each individual signed a consent form agreeing to participate in 
the study and provided permission to be audio taped for the sake of reference and 
accuracy of the data. The audio tapes will be destroyed after the publication of this thesis. 
Each focus group discussion lasted approximately 1-1½ hours followed by individual 
discussions.  The community group proved to be a challenge in terms of scheduling a 
focus group discussion. Therefore, individual discussions and telephone interviews were 
conducted by the author.  Each group was highly verbal and was able to share their views 
comfortably. The participants were able to hear each other’s responses and made 
additional comments beyond their own original responses.  
The objective is to get high quality data in a social context where people can 
consider their own views in the context of the views of others.119 It was extremely 
important to capture all relevant data and to ensure the accuracy of the discussions. The 
author conducted the interview, while the second observer, Dr. Kristie Koenig, was 
present to record notes and key issues that surfaced as recurring themes and asked 
participants to elaborate if it was necessary. Following each session the author and 
second observer together analyzed the survey response. The audio tapes were transcribed 
and analyzed by the author and then shared with the second observer in a follow up 
meeting for her assessment.  The member checking process was then instituted. Member 
checking is a procedure by which the respondents are provided a copy of the interview as 
                                                 
117 One commander elected not to participate in the survey portion of the research.  
118 M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Qualitative Interviewing (Newbury 
Park: Sage, 1990), 335. 
119 Ibid. 
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an opportunity to confirm the accuracy or to extend or clarify information. A copy of the 




The qualitative and quantitative analysis was part of the methodology which 
helped maximize the data collection, identify common features across groups, identify 
divergent issues or perspectives, uncover recurring themes, and interpret the information 
useful for an application method. Qualitative and quantitative aspects can be combined 
within one study to measure certain components of behavior and to see how such 
measures relate to the nature of the experience.120 In this experiment the author 
concentrated on the relationships among the groups. The survey provided the quantitative 
data which was analyzed using descriptive statistics to yield percent agreement and 
differences for the items. The focus group discussions provided the qualitative data for 
this research. The transcribed audiotapes and observer notes were analyzed for recurring 
themes.  
The results are explored in the following chapter. The Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) of the data collected were examined and identified. 
A SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool used to identify the impact of these criteria 
to a study or project.  In this experiment the author considered the following parameters 
in assessing the overall systems view of a joint operational plan:  the mission and vision 
of the PPD,121 stakeholders input, communication network, leadership commitment, 
management priorities, and organizational culture/mindset. These key components helped 
identify obstacles and how to overcome them. It also helped in identifying allies and 
competencies in driving the plan. The goal of this analysis system is to identify 
thoughtful discussions among the participants and comprehend the implications of their 
                                                 
120 L.G. Portney and M.P. Watkins, Foundations of Clinical Research: Applications to Practice, 
Designing Clinical Research (Norwalk: Appleton & Lange, 1993), 238. 
121 Because each media outlet has varying missions and visions it would be impractical to consider 
each one. Since the PPD should take the lead in the joint venture; their mission and vision is a critical 
component in guiding the various media outlet needs.  The author worked under the assumption that the 
community’s mission is one of sound, public safety practices which provides them with timely and accurate 
information.   
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suggestions in promoting a collaborative system which satisfies the needs of each 
respective group that creates public value.    
The power of this exercise increased exponentially when the participants 
collaborated and began to ask questions of other respondents and the research 
facilitator.122  The data was reduced to derive meaning from the exercise. The questions 
were categorized in a systematic way to uncover patterns or themes and to extract 
meaning from the mass information. One of the unique features of this methodology is 
that it allows the researcher to develop research hypotheses as the data unfolds.123 There 
were no predetermined expectations.    
 
F. SUMMARY 
Surveys and interviews were conducted with a diverse group of stakeholders to 
capture the recurring theme in developing police and media relations. While the nature of 
policing is to deal with crisis management, identifying this group was simplistic. 
However, by design, it was critical for the study to identify journalists with significant 
experience in dealing with terrorism or crisis incidents. The goal of the study was to 
develop a policy that addresses the concerns of these stakeholders that challenges the 
prospect of a partnership. A quantitative and qualitative experiment was conducted to 
capture their concerns and to help provide possible solutions. Capturing the accuracy of 
the information was exercised through the member checking process where the 
participants were provided a copy of the data to confirm the information relayed during 
the focus group session. Both the author and the second reader separately tabulated the 
survey and conferred on the results. The parameters of the exercise focused on 
stakeholder input, communication network, mission and vision of the PPD, leadership 
and management priorities, and organizational culture. The questions were designed in a 





                                                 
122 Stringer and Genat,  Action Research in Health. 
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V. RESEARCH FINDINGS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Chapter I, the research question is to determine what strategies the 
PPD and the local media can jointly develop to better calibrate and direct public response 
to a terrorist incident. In the aftermath of a major terrorist incident, can the media and the 
PPD work collaboratively to reduce fear and prevent mass hysteria? This chapter will 
discuss the mixed methodology of survey and focus group interviews used to answer the 
research question. The chapter includes survey results and an examination of these 
findings, followed by an analysis of each focus group discussion with common and 
divergent themes identified amongst the media, police, and community leaders. 
 
B. SURVEY RESULTS  
1. Police and Media 
The survey highlighted several interesting points. Forty-five percent of the police 
indicated they have not undergone any preparation in reporting a terrorist incident to the 
media; whereas 54 percent of the media indicated they have undergone such preparation. 
Statistically, the media is well prepared in contrast to the police. The police and the 
media were about even in terms of having a good relationship with the community; 55 
percent and 54 percent respectively. However, when it came to suggesting the best 
method of covering breaking news concerning a terrorist incident, 64 percent of the 
police opted to provide generic information until there was confirmation of the specifics. 
Thirty-one percent of the media agreed with the police, while 23 percent would prefer to 
immediately release all information to the public. The majority of the media (46 percent) 
felt that providing information to the public as soon as possible was a priority and should 
not be impeded. Nevertheless, the media agreed that the exact information to be provided 
should depend upon the specific situation. The individual situation should dictate whether 
to release information immediately, conduct some background, or provide some generic 
information. The quality of the information provided to the public was key to this 
majority.  
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Both groups recognized reports of terrorism have a psychological effect on the 
public. More than half of the police (55 percent) understood that it depended on the 
information; another 36 percent felt it has a significant psychological effect.  Seventy-
seven percent of the media agreed with the police on both positions.  
The following graph depicts eight core questions of the sixteen from the survey. 
Both groups unanimously understood the objectives of a terrorist attack. A clear majority 
(69%-100%) of both professions recognized that each should participate in the following: 
cross-training between the professions, joint exercises, and helping to educate the public 
in preparation and response. The surprising results rest in whether information should be 
withheld or not. Predictably 91 percent of the police said yes, and, surprisingly, 62 













































































































































The entire community group understood the objectives of a terrorist attack, 
despite that 55 percent had no formal training in counterterrorism. Eighty percent (80 
percent) felt they have an excellent relationship with the police, and the remaining 20 
percent said they have a good relationship. The groups regard of the media was different, 
75 percent said their relationship with the media was neutral, and the remainder of the 
group was split between very poor to good.   
Sixty-five percent recognized that the psychological effect on the public depends 
on the information reported.  More than half (55 percent) agreed with the police that 
breaking news about a terrorist event should contain generic information until the 
information is confirmed. Ninety percent said all of the stakeholders (i.e., police, media, 
and community leaders) are responsible for educating the public about terrorism. 
Seventy-five percent agreed to be a spokesperson during an incident if called upon.  The 
group unanimously agreed to participate in training programs in which they would learn 
and discuss the role of police, the media, and community leaders during a terrorist attack.  
This training will assist these leaders in effectively communicating with the general 
public during a crisis.   
 
C. FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW RESULTS 
1. Media 
In the following section, the author addresses the questions presented to the media 
and a synopsis of the focus group discussions and common themes identified:   
How can the police and media improve in communicating information to the 
public following a terrorist incident? 
Before this could be addressed, some journalists questioned the current 
communication process and the ability of the media to determine whether an incident is 
terrorist-related. For example, immediately following the first plane crash into the World 
Trade Center no one knew it was a terrorist incident. The media argued that as soon as 
the police know something, they should share the information with them. If the police do 
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not know, they should make it clear that they do not know. By no means should the 
police lie, regardless of whether the ultimate intention is to protect the public. Once a lie 
is detected, subsequent information becomes suspect and the inherent mistrust intensifies. 
The media is willing to wait for confirmation on specifics as long as the police are willing 
to share what they can provide without jeopardizing the investigation.  
 Timing the release of information, and what to do with it, is critical. Due to the 
nature of their business, journalists recognize they are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
They are either second to police or, possibly, the first at a scene. Their safety, as well as 
the safety of first responders and the public, is of primary importance in a terrorist 
incident. Therefore, sharing as much information as possible with the media is crucial. A 
good example is the effect of a bioterrorist attack as explained by one journalist. If the 
public is not informed in a timely manner, many risk being exposed to ground zero and 
contaminating others. Therefore, police should be forthcoming with this type of 
information. One journalist covering the 9/11 attacks said officials feared the air at 
ground zero may have been contaminated but reacted slowly. It took two to three days 
before masks were distributed to first responders and the media. Interestingly, another 
journalist countered and said that, ideally, police officials should have this knowledge 
and release it as soon as possible. In reality, this may not be the case because the effect of 
a bioterrorism attack may not be readily noticeable or known to officials until a later 
point.  
An immediate concern for a journalist present at ground zero moments after the 
9/11 attacks was the lack of public official presence in providing information to the 
public. Television was the sole communicator of the 9/11 events and, according to this 
journalist, “our job to the public” was difficult to do. However, once New York Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani began communicating, things quickly changed. The Mayor often 
provided information. He did not “sugar coat” information but provided facts. If he did 
not know something, he stated so. He also informed the public of what he did know and 
what the public needed to know and to do. This journalist felt this type of information 
sharing helped the media and government disseminate critical information and began the 
process of understanding the full effect of the attacks.  
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Another journalist mirrored suggestions by the 9/11 commission that law 
enforcement needs to change its culture from “need-to-know” to “need-to-share” 
information. Typically, law enforcement wants to conduct an investigation and then 
provide information to the media. While most journalists understand this practice, it is 
neither realistic nor practical during a terrorist incident to adopt this “wait for the 
investigation” approach. During a terrorist attack, every minute is vital to the media and 
the public. 
A fiber optic technology was recommended to be a part of the Philadelphia 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This technology would be connected to all of the 
local media outlets for live broadcasting from the EOC within 10-15 minutes of an 
incident. Such technology would allow the PIO or spokesperson to provide the media and 
the public with the latest information.  
While deadlines are critical for the media, deadlines quickly become insignificant 
during a terrorist incident due to live, 24-hour broadcasting. The media prefers reporting 
new information often and providing critical updates to the public. An example would be 
the activation of shelter-in-place protocol. A communication plan will facilitate the 
ability of the media and police to quickly provide this information, particularly to schools 
and high rise buildings.   
What are the barriers in establishing guidelines about how to report an act of 
terrorism? 
The majority of the journalists did not embrace developing guidelines that would 
curtail how information should be disseminated, mainly due to the competitive nature of 
the business. A terrorist incident is a difficult situation to handle and report. Restrictions 
would complicate the reporting, said one editor. However, there was a general consensus 
that the media may agree to an informal, unwritten procedure on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the nature of the incident. Undoubtedly, it will depend on the forged 
relationship between the police and media as well. Most argued that a pre-planned 
guideline would not be honored by most media outlets, but would agree to use more 
generic/non-descriptive language in order to prevent mass hysteria.  
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What are acceptable guidelines or rules in holding back information? 
The media was open to the notion of waiting to release information; however, the 
police need to explain why officials are asking the media to repress information. 
Providing background information is critical for the media to accept the request. How 
City Hall perceives the proposed police and media relationship is also a concern for the 
media. If they are not committed to this venture, then the partnership is seriously 
compromised.  
Journalists recommended that the police and media meet often to discuss 
emergency/crisis issues rather than wait for an incident to occur. As an example, they 
suggested adopting the current Philadelphia COMPSTAT model, where journalists are 
invited to attend the weekly command staff crime strategies meeting but are prohibited 
from using information from the meetings to report directly to the public. Information 
from these meetings can be used to develop new information (i.e., seek public help for 
new information, crime prevention tips, crime stoppers, etc.). A COMPSTAT-style 
meeting for journalists and police will aid in fostering a relationship between both 
organizations and provide a public service.  
The media indicated that they did not need the proposed training program to be 
sold to them; they agreed to the concept of sharing information between the police and 
the media. The journalists stressed that the relationship should be developed on a daily 
basis instead of waiting until an incident brings them together. All agreed on the 
necessity of building trust to avoid false perceptions of convenience for either party. For 
instance, at times, the media feels exploited when the police ask for the public’s help 
through the media to further an investigation, but the police will not reciprocate by 
providing additional information.     
What are the barriers in building trusting relationships between the media and the 
PPD? 
There was a consensus among the media that while the Police Commissioner is 
open to the media, a majority of the command staff is not. It is critical to have a written 
policy regarding when to speak with the media and what to say, otherwise the culture of 
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mistrust will prevail. Ironically, the department has a well written policy encouraging 
trust and openness with the media. However, many personnel still will not speak with the 
media due to the inherent mistrust while other personnel fear being ostracized by the 
organizational [police] culture if they do speak to the media. The command staff should 
be able to speak with the media more often and without reprisal, thus developing a 
relationship at the grass roots level. This type of initiative lends itself to building trust. 
Some journalists felt that the PIO should be able to provide more information during an 
incident. The media would like the PIO to have more authority in the release of 
information and to provide solutions to questions often asked by the media such as:  
• Who has more information about the incident? 
• Where else can information be obtained?  
Should the police and the media train together? 
This focus group agreed that training should be performed on a more regular basis 
than annually. Such training will provide valuable information about both cultures; but, 
more importantly, it will foster a relationship that will help bridge the gap between the 
two organizations. An introductory course should be a part of the police academy 
curriculum to off-set the “us versus them” mentality, which is already part of the recruit 
mind-set. Having a training course at the academy with media personalities will aid in 
bridging any potential gaps early in a police officer’s career.  
One journalist, reflecting on past experiences, stated that other departments have 
made the transition from the police role to the media role by assigning police officers in 
the communications section [Public Affairs] of the department to help understand the 
importance of sharing information with the media and the public. Another expressed that 
he is puzzled by the mistrust, particularly when 90 percent of the reporting about police is 
positive press about what the police are doing to address a situation. The mentality needs 
to change in order to understand the benefit of speaking with the media.   
Journalists agreed that the best training for the media would be a “scenario-based 
type (foxhole).” This will help the media understand why the release of certain 
information may need to be delayed. All agreed that editors/producers/managers and 
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police administrators should adopt a model similar to PDAC and should meet on a 
regular basis to address the concerns of both organizations.  
The media “speaks through experts” as a model to educate the public. They 
suggested having a department member with experience in terrorism begin developing a 
rapport with the media now. This will serve to identify a point person who could be 
interviewed during a crisis to aid the media in addressing an educational response to the 
public.  
Does the news media play a role in educating the public? 
The journalists acknowledge that educating the public is a serious responsibility 
for the police and the media. They pointed out that different media markets have different 
roles and responsibilities. For example, one manager stated while the local media 
provides information to educate the public on what to do (i.e., health advisory and road 
closure information), the national media focuses more on ground zero and the specifics 
leading up to the catastrophe. All stakeholders agreed that participating in a training 
program which shares information on lessons learned from an incident may prove to be 
vital information for the public.   
One interesting note discovered in the focus groups is worth mentioning. What 
the media interprets as good communication tactics are not necessarily viewed as such by 
the police. For example, several police departments and articles written on the DC Sniper 
incident applauded how the Montgomery County Police kept the media and the public 
informed. However, the media viewed it as poor communication. This group complained 
about how local roads were closed, different media outlets were reporting different 
stories, and the local media were not informed of why certain events were occurring. This 
has an eerie similarity to the TMI incident. The principal spokesperson, Chief Moose, 
was viewed by most media as being available, but the perception was that he did not say 
anything of substance or value. Most information learned by the media was leaked 




the capture). One producer said that had the police developed or shared more information 
initially, the media would have been more inclined to restrain use of the leaked 
information.   
Locally, another example surfaced that these journalists collectively felt stifles 
media relations. For instance, Philadelphia government officials in city hall refused to 
provide the media the city’s emergency evacuation plan, despite the fact that this same 
information had been made available to business leaders. The media feels such 
information should be available to them in advance so that they may provide it to the 
general public as a form of preparation for an incident. This is a classic example of why a 
training program is necessary for the police and media. Although admirable and having 
good intentions, the tragic truth is this type of advance general public disclosure can 
threaten the very purpose of the plan; the safety of the public. Sometimes there is no right 
response, except in retrospect. If after a bombing, you dispatch scores of medical, fire, 
and police personnel to evacuate the wounded and secure the scene, many of them will 
die if terrorists have set a second bomb to detonate there.124 Other terrorist incidents have 
taught us that terrorists typically plan for secondary devices in order to cause more harm 
than the initial incident. Therefore, unnecessary and premature exposure by our 
government would be irresponsible and negligent. The media cannot argue with this 
reasonable explanation; but until an effort is made to bridge the communication gap, 
situations like this will continue to fester.    
2. Police 
In this section the author will address the questions presented to the police and 
provide a synopsis of the focus group discussions and common themes identified: 
What can the police and media do better in communicating information to the 
public following a terrorist incident? 
Police are in agreement that providing the media and the public with timely and 
accurate information is vital. Information should not be provided for the sake of 
providing it; it should serve a purpose, such as providing instructions to the public. The 
information should include a plan of action to allay fears and build confidence in the 
                                                 
124 Begley, “Simulations of Attacks by Terrorist Illustrate Challenge Officials Face.” 
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officials charged with relaying that information. There was concern that there is a 
tendency for the police to say something because they feel compelled to make a 
statement. It was stressed that when officials release information, it should be accurate 
and not assumptions or guesswork; otherwise, it will compound any confusion.  
Police officials believe that preparation is the key, and that having a plan prior to 
the incident is imperative to the success of the response. All agreed that a police and 
media training program was a good suggestion. One commander suggested seeking the 
advice of terrorism experts to help facilitate the training. Such training should also 
include senior media personnel and police officials and should endeavor to explain why 
certain information cannot be released. Some thought it would be valuable to have 
managers/editors meet with officials during an incident in an effort to provide accurate 
information to all journalists. 
The media should adopt a policy that aids them in policing themselves when it is 
necessary to refrain from making certain information public. It was generally accepted 
that on a national level some type of government and media relations campaign was 
working particularly with the Embedded Journalist Program. Therefore, a local plan may 
work as well. One commander recommended following the military model of embedded 
journalists as part of a response plan. This model would provide each journalist with 
different parts of the news and serve as an omnipresence of information. Rather than have 
the market drive the news, each episode will provide a unique story and perhaps offset 
the swarm of reporters competing for the entire story. 
These police officials recognized that the media will not wait for official response 
and will report information as they discover it. The media will seek and find information 
from other sources if it is not provided by the police. Controlling information is an 
incredibly daunting task, said one commander. Police will not be successful in controlling 
the media but can be successful in providing information of value. Therefore, the police 
need to cooperate better with the media in order to provide accurate information rather 
than have the media obtain misinformation from other sources, which may lead to 
hysteria.  
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The immediate former Portland, Maine police chief, who presided over the 
department on September 11, raised an interesting point regarding allaying public fears 
when dealing with multiple law enforcement agencies. He supports media relations and 
understands the present era where the media can serve as a more valuable asset than ever 
before. He explained that police typically defer to the federal government. However, 
police need to actively counter the federal government when a situation appears to be 
headed in the wrong direction. For example, identification left at the Boston Airport 
linked two of the 9/11 hijackers to Portland, Maine. The FBI refused to release 
information to the public despite the media frenzy connecting the terrorist to Portland. 
There was widespread fear within the community that there might be sleeper cells. The 
community was anxious and panicky and assumptions were made that the local 
community was also a target. In opposition to the FBI, the Chief called a news 
conference and informed the public of the status of the investigation and the plan of 
action. This helped ease the tension that had been brewing and quell the fallout within the 
community. 
Unless there is collaboration among the different levels of law enforcement (i.e., 
federal/state/local), different information will be disseminated to the public due to the 
different agendas and responsibilities each has to their audience. Fortunately, in 
Philadelphia, the police department and the FBI have an agreement to utilize one 
spokesperson at the Joint Information Center to address the public immediately following 
an incident.  
There were some concerns raised regarding national coverage and the impact it 
will have on local media partnerships. It was generally accepted that once the national 
media gets involved, the local media will absolve their partnership to keep up with the 
national press. As an example, within minutes of what initially appeared to be a shooting 
inside a school in Philadelphia, CNN contacted the public affairs office of the PPD to 
obtain information. A local partnership would be beneficial but many fear that a terrorist 
attack would overwhelm the local media and that the national media would take over. 
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What are potential barriers in establishing guidelines on how to report an act of 
terrorism? 
Competing interest will determine the common ground without violating freedom 
of expression/press and without causing a panic. Terrorists count on the force multiplier 
to create fear, and thus they accomplish their goal. For example, immediately following 
the 2005 London bombings, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner was interviewed by 
the local media on his strategy to address local response. The incident in Maine is also an 
example of how silence from officials may serve as a force multiplier. 
One recommendation was to have key media decision makers and police officials 
help to determine guidelines. This process will assist the media in understanding why the 
police need to retain certain information, as is the case of active investigations. For 
example, the media has proven to be helpful to the PPD in the past by using ruses to 
further an investigation.  
The media is a powerful resource that is often not utilized to its maximum 
potential. The media deserves more credit than it receives. Journalists are not averse to 
media blackouts in order to meet an objective, as was the case with Jill Carroll, the 
journalist held hostage for nearly three months in Iraq in early 2006. Rather than follow a 
traditional outreach to her captives on national television, media officials asked Carroll’s 
parents to allow them to strategize her release. The media agreed to a 72-hour blackout. 
They implemented a strategy to frame stories of Carroll as a person who cared about the 
Arab culture and released information into the local media market that she was there as a 
person to help the Iraqi people. She was portrayed by the media as a sympathizer, and the 
media was instrumental in her release. 
Similar to the media focus group, the police agreed that when developing a policy 
guideline to address a terrorism event, it needs to be general enough that it allows for 
some flexibility. It is difficult to create a policy without knowing the specific threat (i.e., 
bioterrorism or explosion). This is why one of the commanders stressed that training is 
crucial to help focus in on specific response to the media. Clearly, if a commander cannot 
confirm a terrorist attack; that information needs to be very clear to the media.   
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The guidelines should include a component that is specifically based on training 
in addition to implementing a strategic plan. For example, a refinery explosion today is 
treated differently than it would have been before 9/11. The trained commander will 
know exactly what to say to the media and how to allay fears. 
What are the barriers in building trusting relationships between the media and the 
PPD?  
The natural competitiveness inherent to the media acts as a barrier when 
communicating with the media. Each outlet, wanting to outperform their rivals may 
compromise any type of agreement between the police and the media. Most did not agree 
on having an open media policy similar to the system utilized by Scotland Yard. Based 
on the compelling endorsement of this study for police and media relations, this may 
have been a matter of interpretation of what constitutes an open media policy. An open 
media policy is the endorsement of open, honest, and transparency of the department with 
the media and the public. At least one commander felt that the police commissioner 
should be the sole person to respond to the media in the event of a terrorist incident. Like 
the media focus group, the police also felt scenario training, similar to Scotland Yard, 
was the best method of training for helping to close the gap.   
Most agreed on a similar Civilian Police Academy {CPA) training program for 
the police and media (i.e., Media Police Academy [MPA]). Everyone felt an MPA would 
provide the opportunity to forge relationships and dispel rumors and mistrust. It was 
viewed as an opportunity for the exchange of ideas, and would provide the police a sense 
of how and why the media operate in specific situations, such as a terrorist event.   
A police and media auxiliary council (PMAC) should be formed where the police 
commissioner and senior command staff, including the PIO, would meet with senior 
media officials to discuss issues regarding terrorism. The goal being to develop a 
relationship before an incident occurs.  
To promote the development of a trusting relationship, the Police Commissioner 
should meet with general managers of the various media outlets. These general managers 
should understand the Commissioner’s vision of the department and his position on 
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media relations. The PIO plays a significant role in implementing the Commissioner’s 
vision and therefore should forge more than superficial relationships with the media. 
One commander recalled former Philadelphia Police Commissioner, John F. 
Timoney hosting a one-day media training conference with journalist John Miller,125 
former ABC 20/20 reporter and former Deputy Police Commissioner of Public Affairs at 
the NYPD. Miller encouraged the Philadelphia commanders to: 
• Be consistent with the media 
• Return calls 
• Provide as much information as possible, without compromising the 
investigation 
Miller stressed that once a relationship is developed with the media, it is usually 
difficult for the media to circumvent the PIO or the department. Journalists want to report 
accurate information and credibility is important to the media. It is a problem for the 
media when they provide bad information. He stressed that media relationships start with 
the PIO office.  
It is critical to get information out to the public during any incident. For instance, 
this group cited Chief Moose as a very effective principal spokesperson during the DC 
sniper incident. The public wants to see a familiar and trusted face.  
A former PIO mentioned the importance of public officials speaking to the media 
in an expeditious manner and providing as much information as possible as well as a true 
assessment of the conditions. She cited Hurricane Katrina as an example. There were not 
enough officials countering rumors. Rumors were allowed to fester, and the public began 
to believe incidents of rape and murder. Police did not do enough to dispel these rumors 
and failed to control the situation. During the hurricane, the media was the only source of 
information and people needed to hear more from officials. Despite the hurricane 
warnings, officials were not organized in communicating with the media. 
 
 
                                                 
125 Miller is currently the Deputy Director of Public Affairs for the FBI at Washington, DC..  
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Should police and media train together? 
The police also agreed that training the public should be a joint effort. However, a 
few dissenters believed the media should serve as a conduit of information rather than be 
responsible for training/teaching the public. Aside from the police, other agencies should 
join the training campaign as well (i.e., Public Health, Fire Dept., Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, elected officials, etc). The media typically interview terrorist experts 
during such events and should use them to allay fears by discussing the probable effects 
and what steps to take to remain safe. The media raised this issue and suggested having a 
police official knowledgeable in handling terrorism incidents available to them to 
accomplish this objective. 
Some police were surprised to hear that the police department provided the media 
with WMD awareness training. As a result of a series of white powder being delivered to 
the local media, and at the request of media officials, the PPD Counter Terrorism Unit 
(CTU) trained the media on the proper handling of WMD. Relationships developed as a 
result; the department should seize the opportunity to solidify a partnership.   
The general consensus was that it is a good idea for all commanders to receive 
media training. The PIO cannot be everywhere. One commander suggested that it might 
be better for fewer commanders to speak with the media rather than having all or most 
speak to them. This commander suggested information should be referred to the PIO; 
thereby averting bad information in the public domain (i.e., the PIO should run the story). 
The PIO should be the lead person; but in the event of multiple scenes, it is essential to 
have the command staff trained and prepared. Particularly the commanders of the 
Command Inspections Bureau, who are delegated the responsibility to operate the 
department during non-business hours. While an Incident Command System should be 
activated that promotes one spokesperson, it should be flexible enough to include another 





3. Community  
Predictably, this group emphasized their reaction is based on the information 
relayed in the public domain by the police, the media, and other authorities. They 
emphasized the police and the media need to “be factual” about the situation but “should 
be calm and cautious” on how they deliver the information.   
They believe the media gets partial information and that “they fill-in the blanks to 
get better ratings.” The community’s regard of the media is consistent with prior 
literature. Several individuals mentioned that, similar to the New York attacks, there 
would likely be much confusion and the police and the media must avoid irresponsible 
speculation. The right information delivered in the wrong manner can cause chaos 
according to these individuals. Sensationalism during a terrorist attack will only increase 
confusion and create panic.  On the other hand, the police and other authorities must react 
quickly and make sure all the information they are releasing is accurate. The authorities 
should inform the media as soon as they learn any information the public should be aware 
of. It was extremely apparent that the authorities’ role was to stick with the facts and to 
allay fears as quickly as possible. It was essential that information be communicated 
quickly to the public to help mitigate any negative public reaction.   
These community leaders said that, in addition to the information specific to the 
incident, they need to hear explicit instructions from authorities on what to do and the 
potential harm of the incident. For example, one leader said he was confused by 
conflicting media reports on what to do during a “dirty bomb” attack. Initially he learned 
it was safe to go to the lowest point (i.e., the basement); however, that was contradicted 
when he watched another weekly news magazine. Clearly, by these discussions, timely 
and accurate information is essential to public reaction to a terrorist incident.  
 
D. SUMMARY   
In this chapter the author discussed the results of the survey and focus group 
discussions. Several interesting developments surfaced from both exercises. Most 
noteworthy was the fact that the police and the media acknowledged training will aid 
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each organization in abating the mistrust and suspicion inherent between both 
professions. In addition both agreed training would add value in understanding:  
• the significant responsibility to the public each profession shares 
• the usefulness of timely and accurate information 
• the culture each operates under   
• the importance of a need-to-share culture 
• the psychological effects of poor crisis communication 
• the significance of educating the public in preparation and response 
• the significance a terrorist attack has on the media, police, and the public 
• the value of joint exercises such as those discussed in Chapter III (i.e.,  
Scotland Yard, George Washington University, Temple University, and an 
embedded journalist program) 
• in adopting a Media Police Academy  
• the value of meeting regularly to discuss concerns raised by both 
professions 
A surprising 62 percent of the media agreed that certain information should be 
withheld. A strange dichotomy when you consider the industry, but one which supports 
the notion that the media understands the impact of disseminating inappropriate or ill-
timed information and is open to policing itself. The media argued that providing an 
explanation for withholding information helps them honor the police request.  Through 
each discussion exercise, respective members were able to better understand why the 
opposing group could or could not honor a request. This experience helped strengthen the 
notion of understanding the respective culture, hence the need for a partnership.  
Technological recommendations were made and the politics of police and media 
relations surfaced. A critical objective during a crisis situation as described by a journalist 
at ground zero is to immediately have a public official provide information necessary for 
the public to respond. Despite department policy supporting media cooperation, the 
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media did not feel police commanders were open to media, a hindrance to the proposed 
model.  Both the police and media acknowledge a broad guideline is applicable during a 
crisis for both to operate, rather than a specific guideline which leaves little room for 
flexibility.  Both agreed in identifying a subject matter expert prior to an incident to 
address questions and, more importantly, to help reduce any confusion and ally fears.  
Relationships between the community and the police and media were sporadic. 
The community by far enjoyed a much stronger relationship with the police than the 
media. They emphasized the importance of providing factual information and less 
sensationalism.  The community leaders recognized the psychological impact of 
disseminating information in the public domain.  These leaders welcomed instructional 
information during a crisis and they were willing to participate as ambassadors in 














VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
A. IMPLICATIONS 
The results of the survey and the focus group discussions produced a surprising 
dichotomy.  In the survey, an extraordinary 77 percent of the media indicated that they 
had a good to excellent relationship with the police. Similarly, 73 percent of the police 
felt that their relationship was also good to excellent. However, during the discussions it 
was clear that both groups distrusted each other, mainly due to poor communication 
practices. This could be a case where individual relationships were captured in the survey 
exercise and an institutional position was captured in the focus group setting.126  The 
survey results may be the socially desirable response, but the focus group format 
provided a venue to explore the genesis of this inherent mistrust and factors that may 
counterbalance it. It seemed apparent that both groups are socialized into being wary of 
information received from each other or concerned that information once shared will be 
misconstrued. The mixed reactions from the participants suggest that the predominately 
negative description of police and media relations expressed in the prior literature may 
still exist. In light of this analysis, several recommendations have been suggested by the 
participants that may prove useful in identifying programs and policy options in the spirit 
of collaboration.    
A recurring theme emerged during the survey and discussion phase of the study; 
the police are in a position to select, filter, and provide access to information. This places 
them in a position of dominance in relation to the media. Proponents of this view believe 
that the relationship is driven by the police. They are the gatekeepers of information. 
They recognize the media’s needs and use them to the police’s advantage. They define 
reality in terms of images of policing and crime.127 The need for training is clearly 
recognized by each group. There were lessons learned by the participants in these 
discussions. For example, the media learned why the police may not immediately inform 
the media and the public about contaminated air. During the police discussions, the 
                                                 
126William Pelfrey (Department of Homeland Security Office of Grants and Training) interview by 
the author, Monterey, CA, July 15, 2006. 
127 Mawby, Visibility, Transparency and Police-Media Relations.  
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commanders learned that the media is not averse to delaying the release of information. 
Imagine the possibilities of the cross-training. Had the police participated in the media 
discussions, their concerns regarding national vs. local media coverage would have been 
addressed as journalists explained the difference between both media markets.    
Not surprising in this study, it appears that the community trust the police more 
than the media. The entire community group regarded their relationship with the police as 
either good or excellent. The majority of this community group was neutral on media 
relations despite the media’s position of having good community relations.  This is an 
absolute contradiction to the findings in Chapter I, where the public virtually does not 
trust either organization.  
 The reason the PPD enjoys this advantage over the media is mainly due to the 
numerous partnerships and relations developed over the years with its residents, business 
leaders, clergy, and elected officials. There is no reason to doubt that an established 
police and media partnership could improve community relations with the media. The 
bonus of a police and media partnership will surface as collateral benefits during daily 
encounters that should help avoid most of the concerns raised in this report in the event of 
a catastrophic event.    
The author found all of the stakeholders genuine and open in their response and their 
position. The police and media both want to develop a partnership not only for their own 
interests but, equally important, for their consumers - the citizens. The media emphasized 
the importance of responsible journalism and their desire for a partnership that promotes: 
• Training regularly with the police, which includes role playing 
• Consulting with the police on determining the sensitivity of information and 
retaining that information until the appropriate time 
• PMAC, which promotes collaboration 
• Participating in a media police academy training curriculum similar to the current  
civilian police academy (CPA) model 
• Sharing the responsibility of  training the public  
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• Open communication 
• Providing quality information 
• A strategy to reduce panic and mass hysteria 
• A climate of need-to-share information  
• An informal policy on a case-by-case basis on reporting incidents of WMD 
• Informal scheduled meetings with police department authorities to discuss 
counter-terrorism measures and practices 
• Trust   
The police also expressed their desire for a partnership with the media and suggested the 
following: 
• Moving toward a “need-to-share” environment rather than a “need-to-know” 
• Providing timely and accurate information to the media  
• Providing specific instructions to the public through the media 
• Preparation is key; therefore, training with the media is imperative  
• Key decision makers from both organizations should participate in the training 
• Developing a police embedded journalist program similar to the military model 
• Police officials recognizing the media will not wait for information if the police 
do not cooperate; therefore, the police should cooperate with reasonable media 
requests 
• Being responsible in the face of adversity and allay community fears as soon as 
possible 
• Encouraging collaboration with other law enforcement agencies to disseminate 
information during a crisis is critical in reducing confusion  
• Ensuring local media partnership is embraced 
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• Meetings between key decision makers from the police and media should be held  
to develop acceptable guidelines 
• CPA training for the media 
• Sharing responsibility in educating the public  
• Providing a terrorism expert to the media to address questions and help allay 
fears 
• Specialize training for commanders in crisis communication  
• Building trust with the media 
The community leaders focused on ensuring that they receive instructions and 
accurate information. They decried irresponsible journalism and any mishandling of 
critical information that can potentially cause chaos.  In light of these suggestions, many 
recommendations can be made that will ensure that the issues highlighted by police, 
media and the community will be addressed. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A strategic policy must be developed that specifically addresses public reaction to 
local media coverage. Such a policy, ideally, would reduce and/or prevent mass hysteria 
and save thousands of lives during a crisis. Before identifying key strategic dimensions 
of this plan it is very important to understand the current mission of the PPD. The 
mission statement reads: 
The mission of the Philadelphia Police Department is to work in a true 
partnership with our fellow citizens of Philadelphia to enhance the 
quality of life in our city. And, by raising the level of public safety 
through law enforcement, to reduce the fear and incidence of crime. In 
accomplishing these goals: service will be our commitment, honor and 
integrity our mandate.128 
The primary objective of this mission is to maintain a partnership with the citizens 
of Philadelphia where the department provides service to reduce fear and the incidence of 
                                                 
128 Philadelphia Police Department website; available from: http://www.ppdonline.org/hq_mission.php, 
(accessed May 1, 2006). 
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crime. In this post 9/11 era, the goal of reducing fear extends to crisis communication 
with the aim of reducing panic and mass hysteria in response to a terrorist attack. If the 
department fails to reduce fear, the objective is seriously compromised.  
1. Goals 
Preparedness and response through partnership with the media remains the focus 
of this strategic plan, which will close the gap between both organizations and help 
prepare the community in its response to a terrorist incident. The key stakeholders, the 
police and media, must agree to collaborate to successfully champion the objectives of 
this plan. 
If the PPD is to raise the level of public safety, then it is incumbent upon the 
department to take the initiative in preparing and responding jointly with the media to 
minimize the effects of a terrorist attack. Additionally, this joint approach will begin the 
process of developing the relationship into one that is more than merely symbiotic. The 
common denominator for the media and the police is to provide meaningful information 
to the public during an incident. The media and the police can have a powerful 
partnership in this venture.  If they don’t, they will share responsibility for contributing to 
the mass hysteria and panic generally associated with a terrorist incident.   
A comparison of the current police and media relationship vs. the proposed 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. The measurable dimensions necessary for an 
effective relationship between both organizations are low and negative in the current 
system. As mentioned previously, the police and media exist in an environment where 
need-to-know information is highly desirable but sharing it is problematic. The reason for 
the status quo is partly due to cultural differences, negative experiences, and the inability 
to trust each other, which inhibits communication. The PPD does not provide media 
training to its personnel; therefore, the unknown is suspect to the police culture. The 
current strategy is reactive driven. Until a media training curriculum is developed that 
encourages a true open media policy, both organizations will harbor mistrust and 
suspicion.  However, once a training curriculum is introduced, developed, and evolved, a 
vast improvement will be reached, and the archetype shifts to partnership rather than an 
adversarial relationship. The new policy must engage the police and media in an open 
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dialogue that promotes the sharing of information in a timely manner with a mutual 
understanding of how to respond and communicate effectively during a crisis. 
 
















Figure 2.   Police and Media Relations: Current and Proposed Status. 
 
2. Specific Approach  
Although traditionally a police role, with the advent of 24-hour news availability, 
the media should promote preparedness plans and begin to educate the public. The 
continuing proliferation of news on terrorism has slowly entered our psyche and will 
forever continue to be a part of our culture, as it has proven to be for other countries.  
Media coverage and U.S. politicians remind us daily of the significance of the 
GWOT. It is evident by the Penn State survey mentioned in Chapter II that the American 
public has made terrorism a national concern and, subsequently, it has become a hot 
political topic. For instance, President Bush’s approval ratings received the greatest boost 




reelection campaign mainly on the war against terrorism and won.129 All of the 
stakeholders of this report have reacted to the effects of terrorism and support the notion 
for a proactive approach. 
The following Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat (SWOT) analysis 
provides an overview of the notion of a police and media partnership and provides 
direction in identifying the necessary steps in implementing a strategy plan: 
Strengths 
• Improved communication 
• Trust 
• Informed public 
• Improved public confidence 
• Reduction in mass hysteria/fear/panic 
• Cross-cultural understanding  
• Highly skilled staff 
 
Weaknesses 
• Media bias 
• Profit motivated 
• How will the naysayer buy-in 
 
Opportunities 
• Change paradigm  
• Collaborative relationship 
• Information sharing 
• Improved communication - getting the desired message out 
• Prepare the public 
• Save lives 
• Responsible journalism  
• Other agencies can follow 
                                                 
129 John Mueller, Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism (Ohio State University 
Department of Political Science, 2005), 8.  
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• Censored information 
• Resistance from naysayer’s 
• Opportunity cost 
• Who should pay for the training 
• Critics  
 
Clearly the strengths and opportunities outlined above outweigh obstacles that 
may impede the plan. Our efforts to educate the public and promote a responsible 
preparation and response plan are apparent in the SWOT analysis, which supports a 
police and media partnership-relations training program. The first step toward this goal is 
to revisit and revise the mission statement to extend the partnership to the media. An 
emphasis on being open, honest, and transparent, as discussed during the focus group, 
will reinforce our commitment to a partnership. A mission statement similar to Scotland 
Yard’s open media policy will provide a distinctive competency to the PPD. The 
Scotland Yard policy reads in part:130 
We need to refresh our approach to working with the media by developing 
effective and positive relationships with journalists from the wide range of 
news organizations that cover our work…. We have a duty to let the media 
know things that should be in the public domain….It is our policy to be 
open and honest in dealing with the media and respond to their inquiries 
within their deadlines as far as possible….This media policy must be 
reinforced at every level…the success of this policy depends on everyone 
being open and flexible with the media… 
The revised mission statement must propel us toward building a partnership that 
produces the desired outcome of a better informed public. The decision makers must 
agree on the key issues in Figure 3 in developing a police and media training program.  
 
                                                 
130 Metropolitan Police Service Media Relations Policy; available from 
http://www.met.police.uk/media. (accessed April 3, 2006). 
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Figure 3.   Key Aspects of Measurements for a Police and Media Training Curriculum  
 
The two key strategies that emerge from this analysis are training and an outreach 
campaign designed to instruct and reach a larger audience. Effective public relations 
usually precede a story rather than react to it.131 Government officials can beneficially 
employ broad public affairs strategies to combat terrorist-driven initiatives, and the media 
can play an important role within the framework of such a strategy. Training exercises 
are vital, such as those conducted by Scotland Yard, George Washington University, 
[Temple University], and the Technology Institute in Holon, Israel, which bring together 
government officials and media representatives to simulate government response and 
media coverage of mock terrorist incidents. Promoting and funding of similar programs 
on a broad scale internationally is an option for consideration.132 
3. Identify Specific Action Plan 
By establishing a dialogue with the media with the goal of preparing the 
community for a terrorist attack, the PPD can begin to resolve the issues that lead to the 
mutual suspicion and mistrust that has caused a rift between these two groups. The 
following are some initiatives that may produce a solid return on investment:  
• Practice, train, and educate with the media. Invite them to table-top exercises. 
Educate the news managers, reporters and editors that how they deliver the 
news is as important as what news they deliver. Stress to the media that in a 
terrorist event things will go wrong, which is why such an exercise is 
important. As part of the training, the media should be schooled on typical 
public reactions and safety concerns. Include key community leaders to serve 
as ambassadors of this program.  
                                                 
131 Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism.” 







Outreach campaign  
Reduce panic, hysteria, fear 
Save lives, informed public 
Improved P&M relations 
Trust
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• A debriefing session is an invaluable commodity serving as a blueprint for 
preparedness and providing specific examples for future training purposes. 
After an incident, the Police Department should conduct a debriefing exercise 
with the media and community leaders to gather information that may provide 
insight into new ways of coping with future events.  
In an effort to include and form a true partnership with the public, the PPD 
developed the CPA. The purpose of the program is to familiarize community members 
with the operations of the department. The PPD has won accolades from the community 
and politicians for its efforts in reaching out to its citizenry; rapport and trust were forged.  
Hence when a controversy arises, news accounts often reflect a balanced position from 
the community. Similarly, and supported by the focus group participants, much can be 
done in conjunction with the media by opening our department and including them in a 
CPA-style curriculum. The goal of providing timely and accurate information during a 
terrorist incident will help allay unnecessary fear and panic. Included in this curriculum 
should be:  
 
• Police rules, policy, and procedures  
• Shoot, don’t shoot scenarios 
• Off-camera ride-a-longs 
• Internship 
• Counter-terrorism training 
• Cross-disciplinary “culture” training 
• Develop an open media policy similar to the one utilized by Scotland Yard, 
where the department publicly commits to building a productive dialogue with 
the media  
• Promote a  PMAC similar to the PDAC model where public safety issues and 
strategies could be addressed with the decision makers (i.e., editors, 





This proposal has affordable financial and psychological price tags for results that 
are immeasurable. Figure 4 depicts the resources and funding necessary for this project. 
Funding should be obtained from the Urban Area Security Initiative grant in the amount 
of $240,000 for an initial training program in Year One.  An additional $70,000 should be 
appropriated each subsequent year for new training techniques and expertise. Since a 
partial objective is to learn to communicate effectively and to foster mutual relationships, 
we should be guided by other successful training programs that have accomplished this 
objective.  
 
Resources Cost Funding Cost Total 
          
Rank & File 1/2 day $150,000 Printing $5,000   
Commanders 2 days $20,000 Material $20,000   
Media            2 days $20,000 Location 0*   
Community Leaders 1 
day $10,000 Video $15,000   
    Equipment 0*   
Total $200,000   $40,000 $240,000 
      
Figure 4.   Resources and Funding for Police and Media Training 
*Minimal cost for location at the Police Academy; media equipment utilized 
 
 
5. Implementation  
The current Philadelphia Police Commissioner is a visionary. His 42 years of 
police experience has taught him that change is necessary in running a successful 
department. Throughout his tenure as Police Commissioner, he has navigated uncharted 
territory in the spirit of reinventing police strategies. His accessibility to the media is the 
correct position; the key to driving this plan is the Commissioner’s vision for the 
department. His support for a revised mission statement identifying our added value to 
the citizenry and his open commitment to a police and media relationship will alleviate 
the current culture, skepticism, and rejection typically associated with an organization 
adopting a new strategy that may affect traditional methods. His commitment will 
motivate influential participants who will, in turn, motivate others. Like the police, key 
media stakeholders (i.e., editors, producers, and owners) must also convince their rank 
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and file of the necessary collaboration. Without the support of the Police Commissioner 
and these key media personnel this plan simply will not work.   
To ensure this commitment is communicated to the entire department, the 
following options should be considered as a means for delivering the message directly to 
the rank and file: through the departmental CCTV system, the internet web page, 
newsletter, and cable network, etc. The department should promote the joint commitment 
to public safety in a series of public service announcements and at news conferences 
where feasible. Such endorsement will help sway any public skepticism.    
PPD personnel participated in training with the media and other public officials 
hosted by Temple University in March 2006. The training was well received. Best 
practices were discovered and lessons were learned. This training presents the department 
with an opportunity to convert the current relationship into one of mutual esteem for the 
respective professions. The collateral bonus of this strategic plan will surface in daily 




The policing of critical incidents are a salient topic in the post-9/11 environment. 
The tragic events of September 11 in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC 
have shifted the terrorism paradigm from the abstract to a vivid reality for all Americans. 
The early morning hours of this date will be forever etched in our memories. The media 
images that were seared into the American public’s collective conscience remain 
indelible and have had a significant psychological impact. Like the JFK assassination on 
November 22, 1963; September 11, 2001, was a moment where we could account for 
precisely where we were and what we were doing when we heard the unimaginable news. 
There was substantial confusion and scant comprehension with respect to the gravity of 
the circumstances. Our airways came to a halt, our economy was heavily bruised, and our 
sense of security was irrevocably altered.  
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For a very short period of time during the attacks, America was unable to grasp 
the severity of the situation. As media accounts briefed us of the circumstances of 
September 11, the distorted picture became clearer as we realized that we were under 
terrorist attack. Our views of terrorism began to reform. As the days, months, and years 
have passed since the attacks, the media continues to remind us of the GWOT, the 
security measures undertaken in its aftermath, and the vulnerabilities that continue to 
loom. Like the government, the media also possesses compelling power and influence. 
The media impacts our disposition and plays a significant role in our safety.  In times of 
crisis we rely heavily on public officials, namely law enforcement, and the media to keep 
us informed. September 11, and the subsequent emerging threats of terrorism, has 
magnified the critical importance for public officials and the media to communicate 
effectively with the public in delivering a consistent and synoptic message that will 
inform without frightening and educate without provoking alarm.  
Unfortunately, studies have shown that while the public relies on the government 
and media for information specifically on the GWOT, they have little confidence in the 
information. Recent polls have shown both that government’s and journalism’s public 
images have suffered. An opportunity exists for the police [government] and the media to 
improve their respective image. The focus of this thesis is on a crisis response plan, 
whether it is a result of a deliberate or accidental act. Specifically the author examined 
how the media and the police can both help address the public’s response to a post-
terrorist incident. This report also looked at preparedness initiative that informs and 
educates the public in the event of a crisis incident such as a terrorist attack or similar 
catastrophic incident.   
An inherent mistrust and suspicion exists between the police and the media, the 
two sources the public significantly depends upon for information and direction during 
any crisis. There appears to be pre-existing distinction in personalities between the police 
and media. Both organizations have opposing viewpoints on sharing information. Much 
of the controversy stems from cultural differences; the media operates in the need-to-
share environment while the police operate in the need-to-know. Specifically the police 
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object to the media’s sensationalistic use of information versus presenting it in context. In 
a post–9/11 era, this is a recipe for disaster. 
There exists a precarious balancing act for the media; they need to be vigilant 
about balancing society’s right to know against the media’s responsibility to inform. The 
challenge is not only that of media manipulation and psychological response; it also 
includes the delicate navigation between freedom of the press and the eradication of 
terror tactics. It is important to avoid the hijacking and manipulation of the media by 
terrorists. But if freedom of the press is sacrificed in the name of combating terrorism, 
one has allowed small groups of terrorists to destroy one of the basic foundations of a 
democratic society. Pure censorship insults the intelligence of the public and undermines 
confidence in the veracity of the media, but thoughtful and careful media coverage does 
not. We do not want terrorism, or antiterrorism, to erode freedom of the press – one of the 
pillars of democracy.  
This report focused on the PPD, the Philadelphia media, and its citizenry. The 
goal of this study is two-fold. First, to develop a partnership between the police and 
media specific to terrorism and crisis communication and second, to empower the public 
to feel less frightened and be more likely to respond to incidents in a logical and practical 
manner. The objective is to dilute terrorist aims to create psychological trauma. The 
research question for this thesis specifically addresses which strategies the PPD and the 
local media outlets can develop in partnership to better calibrate and direct the public 
response to a terrorist incident. A successful response to this challenge requires precise 
collaboration between the media and local authorities (police), at least until the nation as 
a whole can address this issue effectively.  
This strained relationship between the police and media has existed for decades 
throughout the United States and is not unique to Philadelphia. Criticism of these flawed 
relations should not be viewed as shortcomings of either organization in Philadelphia 
rather they should be viewed as inherent cultural differences. As indicated by a journalist 
who covered the DC sniper case, poor media relations may have a significant impact on 
delivering effective crisis communications.  
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To reduce mistrust and improve the alliance between the media and the police, a 
process similar to the proven CP model discussed in this report should be adopted. The 
CP model promotes partnership and improves communications between the police and 
the community. As much as the police and others would like to thwart the media and 
keep them away from a disaster or other serious situation, they must also realize that the 
media can be a strong ally. The media, too, must learn that how they frame the news is 
important since it can impede active investigations and cause a panicked public and an 
unintentional conveyance of terrorist propaganda. Without an organized partnership with 
the media, the PPD is failing to meet a core competency of its mission statement to the 
public (i.e., to reduce fear).   
Communicating with the public is not an exact science; different people will 
interpret the same message differently. This is precisely why, during times of catastrophic 
events, the words chosen to communicate with the public must be carefully articulated. 
The ill-trained crisis communicator (police or media) may cause more harm than the 
actual event. Amassing “a reservoir of goodwill” among the stakeholders is essential; 
failure to do so creates an environment that feeds terrorist objectives.  
If we accept the notion that the purpose of terrorist acts is to instill fear and panic 
in the targeted population, can we then accept the supplementary notion that any 
lessening of the negative impact of these acts may force the terrorist to abandon this 
method? Perhaps not totally, but surely learning to respond with less crippling emotion 
might weaken the terrorist’s resolve.   Combating our emotional vulnerability to terrorism 
may be even more important than defeating Al Qaeda and is, perhaps, a more attainable 
goal. By minimizing and controlling our negative reactions, we can undermine the 
terrorists' goals. As Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, "the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself." We can ensure that terrorists don't succeed by preventing them from ruling our 
lives through fear and by being rational and logical, even though it may be antithetical to 
our innate emotions.  
Law enforcement officials harbor critical information during major disasters, and 
the manner in which this information is disseminated is vital to ensuring a healthy public 
reaction. The media plays a decisive role in the aftermath of an incident; providing 
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essential information and instructions to victims and their families. Both the media and 
the police are key resources for the community and can provide a source of hope during a 
time of crisis. Both organizations have a significant impact on managing the crisis. One 
of the most important functions of the media is its contribution to the preparation and 
response phase of consequence management. We have learned, through proven 
international methods in countries like Israel, Britain, and Australia, that preparing and 
educating the public through the media is an effective strategy. The PPD has been 
provided with a fortuitous opportunity as the result of a local university’s initiative 
training program, which supports media and law enforcement relations during an 
emergency. We must seize this opportunity. 
A strategic plan has been recommended that takes a proactive approach rather 
than the traditional reactive response to terrorism. The strengths and opportunities 
provided by forging improved police and media relations outweigh the weaknesses by a 
significant margin. The return on investment for building a partnership has the potential 
of delivering huge dividends in the form of: 
• Improved communication practices   
• Mutual trust 
• Informed public 
• Improved public confidence 
• Collaborative relationship 
Throughout this report examples were discovered of how the PPD can develop its 
own police and media methods and the benefits it will provide. For example, George 
Washington University, in Washington, DC, and Temple University, in Philadelphia, PA, 
independently developed a training program to facilitate government and media relations 
during a crisis. An array of recommendations, lessons learned, and best practices from 
national and international government entities were unveiled and presented. Any of the 
suggestions would be an improvement over the current state of affairs between the police 
and the media in Philadelphia.  
The need for training to raise awareness of the role the media plays during 
terrorist/emergency incidents and the impact their reporting has on the public must be 
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taken seriously for the benefit of the citizenry. The actions and language exercised by the 
police and the media are critical in shaping public behavior. With proper training and 
collaboration, the message delivered in the public domain can help thwart the objectives 
of terrorists. Engaging in proven practices, while utilizing a fresh approach that relies on 
the coexistence of both organizations, is necessary to effectively prepare and respond to a 
catastrophic incident.  
The most valuable input came from the stakeholders during the survey and focus 
group phase. While each profession acknowledged the inherent mistrust between the 
parties, they also grasped the importance of forming a partnership. Independently, each 
profession unanimously agreed to participate in a police and media training curriculum. 
A clear majority of both professions recognized that each should participate in cross-
training, joint exercises, and helping to inform the public in preparation and response.  
This training will assist in improving crisis communication and educating the public on 
terrorism readiness. Consistent with prior literature the police and media agreed that 
general guidelines too often do not fit all cases and should be handled on a case-by-case 
basis. Surprisingly, a significant number of media participants agreed to restrain 
information when provided with an explanation for the reason to withhold the 
information. Until police are educated about the effect the media can have on the 
department, the power of the media works against the police rather than for it.  
Nearly all Philadelphia police commanders interviewed agreed that the police 
need to cooperate better with the media in the spirit of providing accurate information 
that may allay fears and prevent mass hysteria. Police and media officials both agreed 
that promoting a police media auxiliary council (PMAC), similar to the existing PDAC 
model, where public safety issues and strategies can be addressed with the decision 
makers, is a step in the right direction. The success of, and responsibility for, this plan 
falls squarely on the shoulders of select key stakeholders: the Philadelphia Police 
Commissioner and key media decision makers. Without their support, the strategic plan 
and the participant’s recommendations will stagnate. 
This report shed light on the importance of community organizations’ 
involvement in the development and dissemination of information. The community 
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leaders played a significant role in the study. Their unusually high confidence in the 
police contradicts national findings, which may be attributed to the PPD’s successful CP 
model. These participants were skeptical of the media and perceived information 
disseminated by the media as partially accurate at times.  The neutral position held by the 
community regarding their relationship with the media is consistent with prior literature 
and the studies found in Chapter I.  The majority of this group insisted on being provided 
with precise instructions concerning crisis response helpful to them. Community 
residents want to know what to do in the event of an emergency. Such knowledge helps 
them to control and, therefore, tolerate risks.133 Another terrorist attack is far from a 
remote possibility. We must prepare for the possibility, physically and psychologically. 
Trust is a central factor in predicting whether community members will accept and rely 
on the conclusions and recommendations of the people who are trained in crisis 
management.  
The information encompassed in this document may serve as an effective tool to 
thwart the objectives sought by terrorists. Having the media and the police work towards 
a common goal, albeit a challenging and unconventional one, will significantly impact 
the terrorists, who depend considerably upon the media frenzy. Most of the proposed 
strategies are unprecedented in this nation. By following the practices outlined in this 
report, the PPD and the Philadelphia media will be pioneers in effectively dealing with 
the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
 
The Wisdom of a Partnership will Out-weigh the Independent Role 
 
                                                 
133 Heath and Palenchar, “Community Relations and Risk Communication.”  
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APPENDIX  
A. SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS  
 
1. Media Survey and Focus Group Questions 
A. Survey: 
  
1. What is your position in the media? 
 
a. Reporter   b. Anchor    c. Editor/Producer   d. Mgr.        
 
2. What preparation have you undergone to report a terrorist attack? 
 
a. none   b. one day briefing   c. conference   d. seminar   e. other______________  
 
3. What are the objectives of a terrorist attack? 
 
a. create panic   b. fear   c. harm   d. influence political decision   e. death   f. all of 
the above   e. not sure  
 
4. How would you describe your relationship with the police? 
 
a. very poor   b. poor   c. neutral   d. good   e. excellent 
 
5. What is your relationship with community leaders? 
 
a. very poor   b. poor   c. neutral   d. good   e. excellent 
 
6. What is the best method of covering “breaking news” concerning a terrorist 
incident? 
 
a. immediately make all information public   b. conduct background information 
 
c. wait for an official to confirm   d. provide generic information until  
 




7. If you are a manager/supervisor are you willing to edit raw footage of a 
terrorist attack during the infancy stage of breaking news? 
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a. no   b. if time permits   c. yes 
 
 
8. If formal guidelines were developed by all news organization (competitors) in 
concert with government/police officials in reporting acts of terrorism, how 
successful would it be? 
 




9. What psychological effects do you think reports of terrorism have on the 
public? 
 
a. no effect   b. minimal effect   c. depends on information reported   d. moderate 
effect   e. significant effect 
 
10. Are you willing to withhold critical information from the public immediately 
following a terrorist incident that has the potential of creating mass hysteria if 
it were made public? 
 
a. no  b. yes 
 
11. Are you willing to participate in a Media Police Academy training program 
that focuses on police & media responsibilities during a terrorist incident? i.e. 
reporting and crisis communication 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
12. Who is responsible for educating the public about terrorism? 
 
a. police   b. other government (HLS/Mayor)   c. media   d. police & media   e. 
community leaders   f. all of the above 
   
13. Are you willing to train the public in preparing/responding to a terrorist 
attack? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
14. In your opinion should the media and police jointly play a significant role in 
educating the public about terrorism? 
 
a. no   b. yes   
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15. Would you participate in table top exercises with police, community leaders, 
and the media that would simulate a terrorist attack? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
16. Would you participate in debriefing exercises with the police, community 
leaders, and the media to develop lessons learned/best practices that may 
provide insight in coping with similar incidents?  
 
a. no    b. yes 
 
B. Focus Group 
 
1. What can the PPD and the media do better in reporting a terrorist attack 








2. What might be the barriers in implementing a policy that establishes guidelines 
on how to report an act of terrorism? 
 
Suggestions on a doable policy: 
 
 
3. What are the barriers to building trusting relationships between the media and 
the PPD?  
 
Probe: Open Media Policy? 
 
4. From your experience, what has facilitated this relationship? 
 
 
5. What are your thoughts concerning a police & media training program? (Media 
Police Academy) 
 
Probe: Terrorism training 
 














2. Police Survey and Focus Group Questions 
A. Survey 
 
1. What is your position in the police department? 
 
a. P/O    b. Supervisor   c. Commander        
 
2. What preparation have you undergone to report a terrorist attack? 
 
a. none   b. one day briefing   c. conference   d. seminar   e. other______________  
 
3. Are you willing to withhold critical information from the public immediately 
following a terrorist incident that has the potential of creating mass hysteria if it 
were made public? 
 
a. no  b. yes 
 
4. What are the objectives of a terrorist attack? 
 
a. create panic   b. fear   c. harm   d. influence political decision   e. death   f. all of 
the above   e. not sure  
 
5. How would you describe your relationship with the media? 
 
a. very poor   b. poor   c. neutral   d. good   e. excellent 
 
6. What is your relationship with community leaders? 
 
a. very poor   b. poor   c. neutral   d. good   e. excellent 
 
 




a. immediately make all information public   b. conduct background information 
 
c. wait for an official to confirm   d. provide generic information until  
 
confirmation   e. other_____________ 
 
8. If you are a manager/supervisor are you willing to edit raw footage of a terrorist 
attack during the infancy stage of breaking news? 
 
a. no   b. if time permits   c. yes 
 
9. If formal guidelines were developed by all news organization (competitors) in 
concert with government/police officials in reporting acts of terrorism, how 
successful would it be? 
 




10. What psychological effects do you think reports of terrorism have on the public? 
 
a. no effect   b. minimal effect   c. depends on information reported   d. moderate 
effect   e. significant effect 
  
11. Are you willing to participate in a Media Police Academy training program that 
focuses on police & media responsibilities during a terrorist incident? i.e. 
reporting and crisis communication 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
12. Who is responsible for educating the public about terrorism? 
 
a. police   b. other government (HLS/Mayor)   c. media   d. police & media   e. 
community leaders   f. all of the above 
   
13. Are you willing to train the public in effectively preparing/responding to a 
terrorist attack? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
14. In your opinion, should the media and police jointly play a significant role in 
educating the public about terrorism? 
 
a. no   b. yes   
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15. Would you participate in table top exercises with police, community leaders, and 
the media that would simulate a terrorist attack? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
16. Would you participate in debriefing exercises with the police, community leaders, 
and the media to develop lessons learned/best practices that may provide insight 
in coping with similar incidents?  
 
a. no b. yes 
 
B. Focus Group 
 
1. What can the PPD and the media do better in reporting a terrorist attack 








2. What might be the barriers in implementing a policy that establishes guidelines 
on how to report an act of terrorism? 
 
Suggestions on a doable policy: 
 
 
3. What are the barriers to building trusting relationships between the media and 
the PPD?  
 
Probe: Open Media Policy? 
 
4. From your experience, what has facilitated this relationship? 
 
 
5. What are your thoughts concerning a police & media training program? (Media 
Police Academy) 
 
Probe: Terrorism training 
 














C. Community Survey and Focus Group Questions  
A. Survey 
 
1. What is your position in the community? 
 
a. Block captain   b. Resident    c. Active resident (Town watch /PDAC)   d. 
Business Owner   e. Elected Official  
       
 
2. What preparation have you undergone in responding to a terrorist attack? 
 
a. none   b. one day briefing   c. conference   d. seminar/ just what read or watch 
on T.V.   e. other______________  
 
3. What are the objectives of a terrorist attack? 
 
a. create panic   b. fear   c. harm   d. influence political decision   e. death   f. all of 
the above   e. not sure  
 
 
4. How would you describe your relationship with the police? 
 
a. very poor   b. poor   c. neutral   d. good   e. excellent 
 
 
5. How would you describe your relationship with the media? 
 




6. What is the best method of covering “breaking news” concerning a terrorist 
incident? 
 
a. immediately make all information public   b. conduct background information 
 
c. wait for an official to confirm   d. provide generic information until  
 




7. What psychological effects do you think reports of terrorism have on the 
public? 
 
a. no effect   b. minimal effect   c. depends on information reported   d. moderate 
effect   e. significant effect 
 
8. Are you willing to train with police/media and other experts in dealing with 
terrorist incidents and in crisis communication? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
9.  Are you willing to participate in a Media Police Academy program that focuses 
on police & media responsibilities during a terrorist incident?  
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
10. Who is responsible for educating the public about terrorism? 
 
a. police   b. other government (HLS/Mayor)   c. media   d. police & media   e. 
community leaders   f. all of the above 
   
11. Are you willing to be a spokesperson immediately after an attack to help allay 
fears of terrorism? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
12. In your opinion should the media and police jointly play a significant role in 
educating the public about terrorism? 
 





13. Would you participate in table top exercises with police, community leaders, and 
the media that would simulate a terrorist attack? 
 
a. no   b. yes 
 
14. Would you participate in debriefing exercises with the police, community leaders, 
and the media to develop lessons learned/best practices that may provide insight 
in coping with similar incidents?  
 
a. no b. yes 
 
B. Focus Group 
1. What can the PPD, the media, and you do better in reporting a terrorist attack 
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